Project acronym COGNITION
Project Cognition and Decision-Making: Laws, Norms and Contracts
Researcher (PI) Jean Tirole
Host Institution (HI) FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2009-AdG
Summary The application's unifying theme is cognition. Any decision reflects the information that comes to the decision-maker's awareness at the moment of making the decision. In turn, this information is the stochastic outcome of a sequence of more or less conscious choices and of awareness manipulation by third parties. The three parts of this application all are concerned with two factors of limited awareness (cognitive costs and motivated beliefs) and with the application of imperfect cognition to economics. The various projects can be subsumed into three themes, each with different subprojects: 1. Self-serving beliefs, laws, norms and taboos (expressive function of the law, taboos, dignity and contracts). 2. Cognition, markets, and contracts (mechanism design under costly cognition, directing attention in markets and politics). 3. Cognition and individual decision-making (foundations of some non-standard preferences). The methodology for this research will be that of formal economic modeling and welfare analysis, enriched with important insights from psychology and sociology. It will also include experimental (laboratory) investigations. The output will first take the form of a series of articles in economics journals, as well as, for the research described in Part 1, a book to disseminate the research to broader, multidisciplinary and non-specialized audiences.
Summary
The application's unifying theme is cognition. Any decision reflects the information that comes to the decision-maker's awareness at the moment of making the decision. In turn, this information is the stochastic outcome of a sequence of more or less conscious choices and of awareness manipulation by third parties. The three parts of this application all are concerned with two factors of limited awareness (cognitive costs and motivated beliefs) and with the application of imperfect cognition to economics. The various projects can be subsumed into three themes, each with different subprojects: 1. Self-serving beliefs, laws, norms and taboos (expressive function of the law, taboos, dignity and contracts). 2. Cognition, markets, and contracts (mechanism design under costly cognition, directing attention in markets and politics). 3. Cognition and individual decision-making (foundations of some non-standard preferences). The methodology for this research will be that of formal economic modeling and welfare analysis, enriched with important insights from psychology and sociology. It will also include experimental (laboratory) investigations. The output will first take the form of a series of articles in economics journals, as well as, for the research described in Part 1, a book to disseminate the research to broader, multidisciplinary and non-specialized audiences.
Max ERC Funding
1 910 400 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-04-01, End date: 2016-03-31
Project acronym DCFM
Project Default and Collateral in Financial Markets
Researcher (PI) Ioannis Vailakis
Host Institution (HI) THE UNIVERSITY OF EXETER
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2009-StG
Summary The main objective of this project is to research the economic implications of default and collateral in financial markets. It is motivated from the observation that much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral and by the empirical fact that modern economies experience a substantial amount of default and bankruptcy. From a theoretical perspective, the research aims to explore new ways of modelling default and collateral and employ them to evaluate the impact of default and collateral on market outcomes. From a policy recommendation perspective, the research aims to develop models with testable implications that can be used by practitioners to discuss the consequences of a wide range of policies. In particular, to explore which kind of regulation procedures should be implemented in order to lower the risk of default and at the same time not to reduce too much risk-sharing. The agenda includes two research directions. The first research direction will focus on the implications of default and collateral in economies with bounded rational agents. Our aim is to understand how default and collateral affect market outcomes in environments where agents are allowed to have very divergent and therefore possibly incorrect beliefs about endogenous economic variables like future prices and delivery rates. The second research direction will focus on the implications of default and collateral in economies with an open ended horizon. Our aim is to investigate endogenous debt constraints that are compatible with equilibrium and simultaneously allow for as much risk sharing as possible.
Summary
The main objective of this project is to research the economic implications of default and collateral in financial markets. It is motivated from the observation that much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral and by the empirical fact that modern economies experience a substantial amount of default and bankruptcy. From a theoretical perspective, the research aims to explore new ways of modelling default and collateral and employ them to evaluate the impact of default and collateral on market outcomes. From a policy recommendation perspective, the research aims to develop models with testable implications that can be used by practitioners to discuss the consequences of a wide range of policies. In particular, to explore which kind of regulation procedures should be implemented in order to lower the risk of default and at the same time not to reduce too much risk-sharing. The agenda includes two research directions. The first research direction will focus on the implications of default and collateral in economies with bounded rational agents. Our aim is to understand how default and collateral affect market outcomes in environments where agents are allowed to have very divergent and therefore possibly incorrect beliefs about endogenous economic variables like future prices and delivery rates. The second research direction will focus on the implications of default and collateral in economies with an open ended horizon. Our aim is to investigate endogenous debt constraints that are compatible with equilibrium and simultaneously allow for as much risk sharing as possible.
Max ERC Funding
156 538 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-06-01, End date: 2012-06-30
Project acronym Disasters
Project Market Beliefs and Optimal Policy in the Presence of Disasters
Researcher (PI) Ian William Richard Martin
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary My proposal consists of two strands linked by a common theme--namely a concern for the impact of disasters, in financial markets and more generally--and by a shared methodology.
In the first of these strands, I propose to develop ways of using observable asset price data to infer the beliefs of market participants about various quantities that are central to financial economics, including (i) the equity premium; (ii) the forward-looking autocorrelation of the market (i.e., time-series momentum); (iii) the risk premia associated with individual stocks; (iv) the correlation between stocks; and (v) measures of asymmetric risk, such as the forward-looking probability of a significant downward jump in the stock market over some prescribed time period.
This work will exploit theoretical techniques that I have developed in previous research, and that allow for the possibility of jumps and disasters in financial markets. I will therefore be able to avoid the unpalatable assumption—which is made, implicitly or explicitly, in much of the finance literature—that uncertainty is driven by conditionally Normally distributed shocks (or, in continuous time, by Brownian motions). The importance of doing so is underscored by the turmoil in financial markets over the last few years.
These techniques will also be applied in the second strand of my proposal, which focuses on issues related to catastrophes more generally, including for example climate change; highly contagious viruses on the scale of the influenza pandemic of 1918; or nuclear or bio-terrorism. This project will be joint with Professor Robert S. Pindyck of MIT. The goal is to provide a framework within which policymakers, faced with multiple different types of potential catastrophe, can determine how society’s limited resources should best be used to alleviate the associated risks.
Summary
My proposal consists of two strands linked by a common theme--namely a concern for the impact of disasters, in financial markets and more generally--and by a shared methodology.
In the first of these strands, I propose to develop ways of using observable asset price data to infer the beliefs of market participants about various quantities that are central to financial economics, including (i) the equity premium; (ii) the forward-looking autocorrelation of the market (i.e., time-series momentum); (iii) the risk premia associated with individual stocks; (iv) the correlation between stocks; and (v) measures of asymmetric risk, such as the forward-looking probability of a significant downward jump in the stock market over some prescribed time period.
This work will exploit theoretical techniques that I have developed in previous research, and that allow for the possibility of jumps and disasters in financial markets. I will therefore be able to avoid the unpalatable assumption—which is made, implicitly or explicitly, in much of the finance literature—that uncertainty is driven by conditionally Normally distributed shocks (or, in continuous time, by Brownian motions). The importance of doing so is underscored by the turmoil in financial markets over the last few years.
These techniques will also be applied in the second strand of my proposal, which focuses on issues related to catastrophes more generally, including for example climate change; highly contagious viruses on the scale of the influenza pandemic of 1918; or nuclear or bio-terrorism. This project will be joint with Professor Robert S. Pindyck of MIT. The goal is to provide a framework within which policymakers, faced with multiple different types of potential catastrophe, can determine how society’s limited resources should best be used to alleviate the associated risks.
Max ERC Funding
1 287 755 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-05-01, End date: 2020-04-30
Project acronym EATP
Project Evolutionary Approaches Towards Preferences
Researcher (PI) Balazs Szentes
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2009-StG
Summary A recent psychological and experimental literature on human behavior suggests that standard preferences assumed in economic models are inadequate to explain human choice behaviors in numerous environments. The primary objective of this project is to establish evolutionary foundations for non-standard preferences. Most models in economics take preferences as given and derive the choices induced by these preferences. We intend to do just the opposite. We characterize the choice behavior that would survive evolution and then represent this choice behavior with preferences. That is, we identify the preferences that induce evolutionarily stable choice behavior. We identify each choice behavior with a gene. Hence, the choices an individual makes during her lifetime are determined by her genes, where these are inherited from her parents. A population can be defined as a group of individuals having the same genes. Populations with different genes may grow at different rates. Only those genes that induce the highest possible population growth rate given the physical environment survive evolution. We wish to apply the principle described above to derive implications for time preferences, preference for similarities, preferences for discrimination, preferences for conformity, and other important socio-economic behaviors. The goal of the project is to provide a theoretical guidance for which preferences are admissible and which are not likely to arise.
Summary
A recent psychological and experimental literature on human behavior suggests that standard preferences assumed in economic models are inadequate to explain human choice behaviors in numerous environments. The primary objective of this project is to establish evolutionary foundations for non-standard preferences. Most models in economics take preferences as given and derive the choices induced by these preferences. We intend to do just the opposite. We characterize the choice behavior that would survive evolution and then represent this choice behavior with preferences. That is, we identify the preferences that induce evolutionarily stable choice behavior. We identify each choice behavior with a gene. Hence, the choices an individual makes during her lifetime are determined by her genes, where these are inherited from her parents. A population can be defined as a group of individuals having the same genes. Populations with different genes may grow at different rates. Only those genes that induce the highest possible population growth rate given the physical environment survive evolution. We wish to apply the principle described above to derive implications for time preferences, preference for similarities, preferences for discrimination, preferences for conformity, and other important socio-economic behaviors. The goal of the project is to provide a theoretical guidance for which preferences are admissible and which are not likely to arise.
Max ERC Funding
600 000 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-01-01, End date: 2015-12-31
Project acronym Econ_Prejudice
Project The Economics of Ethnic Prejudice
Researcher (PI) Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Host Institution (HI) ECOLE D'ECONOMIE DE PARIS
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2014-CoG
Summary Why do ethnic differences matter in some cases and not in others? What determines the strength of ethnic self-identification? This question is central to understanding the consequences of ethnic divisions for conflict and economic development and their policy implications but it was neglected by economic research until now. This project aims at filling this gap by endogenizing ethnic identity. We study how the salience of ethnic differences depends on economic and social context and policies of nation building. Our research program is organized around 3 pillars focusing on social, economic, and political determinants of ethnic tensions, respectively. The first pillar tests social psychology theories of ethnic identity using natural experiments, generated by forced mass movements of ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and from Eastern Europe to Central Asia as a result of WWII. The second pillar studies how market interactions between representatives of different ethnic groups and, in particular, ethnic occupational segregation affects ethnic tensions in the context of historical anti-Jewish violence following agro-climatic income shocks in the 19th and 20th century Eastern Europe. The third pillar focuses on the effects of political manipulation on ethnic conflict in the context of the historical experiment of nation building in Central Asia. It studies how political empowerment of a certain ethnic elite in a multi-ethnic traditional society coupled with a set of nation-building policies affects ethnic conflicts depending on the pre-existing ethnic mix and the distribution of political power among ethnic elites. This research will shed light on factors that make ethnic diversity important for conflict and economic development.
Summary
Why do ethnic differences matter in some cases and not in others? What determines the strength of ethnic self-identification? This question is central to understanding the consequences of ethnic divisions for conflict and economic development and their policy implications but it was neglected by economic research until now. This project aims at filling this gap by endogenizing ethnic identity. We study how the salience of ethnic differences depends on economic and social context and policies of nation building. Our research program is organized around 3 pillars focusing on social, economic, and political determinants of ethnic tensions, respectively. The first pillar tests social psychology theories of ethnic identity using natural experiments, generated by forced mass movements of ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and from Eastern Europe to Central Asia as a result of WWII. The second pillar studies how market interactions between representatives of different ethnic groups and, in particular, ethnic occupational segregation affects ethnic tensions in the context of historical anti-Jewish violence following agro-climatic income shocks in the 19th and 20th century Eastern Europe. The third pillar focuses on the effects of political manipulation on ethnic conflict in the context of the historical experiment of nation building in Central Asia. It studies how political empowerment of a certain ethnic elite in a multi-ethnic traditional society coupled with a set of nation-building policies affects ethnic conflicts depending on the pre-existing ethnic mix and the distribution of political power among ethnic elites. This research will shed light on factors that make ethnic diversity important for conflict and economic development.
Max ERC Funding
1 598 308 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-11-01, End date: 2020-10-31
Project acronym FLUCTUATIONS
Project Research on Economic Fluctuations and Globalization
Researcher (PI) Maria Silvana Tenreyro
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2009-StG
Summary The first strand of the proposal seeks to study housing market fluctuations. Housing markets play a prominent role in the economy and in the conduct of monetary policy and yet standard DSGE models often ignore them. In a first project, we will study both empirically and theoretically seasonal fluctuations in housing markets. We view this as an important first step to shed light on the models needed to describe housing markets. A second project will build on these modelling implications to develop a macroeconomic framework that accounts for lower-frequency fluctuations in housing markets; in particular, we will study the effects of different economic shocks and optimal policy responses, with particular attention to the mechanism through which initial shocks get amplified and transmitted to the rest of the economy. The second strand will seek to understand and quantify the role of international trade, and in particular the emergence of China and India, in explaining the sharp decline in the volatility of aggregate fluctuations experienced by most advanced economies since the mid 1980s. Concretely, the project will ask both theoretically and empirically the extent to which counting on a wider pool of input suppliers from non-traditional trading partners has mitigated the effect of economic shocks on output and prices. As an auxiliary tool, a second project will develop a new econometric test for model selection. The final strand has two main branches. In the first, we will propose a model to study the role of optimality of employment relations in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In the second, we will develop a model to asses the role of liquidity in the transmission mechanism. Testable implications from these two models will be empirically assessed.
Summary
The first strand of the proposal seeks to study housing market fluctuations. Housing markets play a prominent role in the economy and in the conduct of monetary policy and yet standard DSGE models often ignore them. In a first project, we will study both empirically and theoretically seasonal fluctuations in housing markets. We view this as an important first step to shed light on the models needed to describe housing markets. A second project will build on these modelling implications to develop a macroeconomic framework that accounts for lower-frequency fluctuations in housing markets; in particular, we will study the effects of different economic shocks and optimal policy responses, with particular attention to the mechanism through which initial shocks get amplified and transmitted to the rest of the economy. The second strand will seek to understand and quantify the role of international trade, and in particular the emergence of China and India, in explaining the sharp decline in the volatility of aggregate fluctuations experienced by most advanced economies since the mid 1980s. Concretely, the project will ask both theoretically and empirically the extent to which counting on a wider pool of input suppliers from non-traditional trading partners has mitigated the effect of economic shocks on output and prices. As an auxiliary tool, a second project will develop a new econometric test for model selection. The final strand has two main branches. In the first, we will propose a model to study the role of optimality of employment relations in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In the second, we will develop a model to asses the role of liquidity in the transmission mechanism. Testable implications from these two models will be empirically assessed.
Max ERC Funding
544 582 €
Duration
Start date: 2009-10-01, End date: 2013-09-30
Project acronym GGTMI
Project Getting back to Growth through Technological and Managerial Innovation
Researcher (PI) John Van reenen
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2014-ADG
Summary The objective of the proposal is to examine ways to increase European growth through technological and managerial innovation. The technological innovation aspect is focused on examining the lifecycle of innovators and entrepreneurs across several advanced countries. We will examine the impact of financial constraints, tax and schooling policies on stimulating greater innovation. The second theme will examine by how much managerial practices can account for differences in the wealth of nations and how management quality can be improved, focusing on randomized control trials of business support polices. In addition to conducting our own surveys and drawing on administrative data, we will use Big Data techniques to measure management and corporate culture within firms. As a package this will constitute a ground-breaking piece of social science that will change the way we think about what drives prosperity across firms and countries. We are confident that this will lay foundations for better policies in Europe and elsewhere to help improve growth.
Summary
The objective of the proposal is to examine ways to increase European growth through technological and managerial innovation. The technological innovation aspect is focused on examining the lifecycle of innovators and entrepreneurs across several advanced countries. We will examine the impact of financial constraints, tax and schooling policies on stimulating greater innovation. The second theme will examine by how much managerial practices can account for differences in the wealth of nations and how management quality can be improved, focusing on randomized control trials of business support polices. In addition to conducting our own surveys and drawing on administrative data, we will use Big Data techniques to measure management and corporate culture within firms. As a package this will constitute a ground-breaking piece of social science that will change the way we think about what drives prosperity across firms and countries. We are confident that this will lay foundations for better policies in Europe and elsewhere to help improve growth.
Max ERC Funding
1 957 592 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-11-01, End date: 2020-10-31
Project acronym GOV
Project Corporate Governance
Researcher (PI) Ayse Irem Tuna Richardson
Host Institution (HI) LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2010-StG_20091209
Summary The objective of this proposal is to apply for an ERC Starting Grant to support a careful study of the design and implications of corporate governance. Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that are designed to address the conflicts between the managers and owners of assets when there is a separation of ownership and control. These mechanisms are intended to monitor the person who has control over the assets so that the use of the assets does not conflict with the incentives of the owners of the assets. Boards of directors, institutional shareholders, and the market for corporate control are some examples of corporate governance mechanisms that are expected to mitigate the potential conflicts between owners and the managers. Based on the prior work of others and my own, I am convinced that an attempt to measure the role of the individual style and preferences in corporate decision making and corporate governance will be fruitful. The series of research I conducted so far developed my perspective as a researcher, making me appreciate better the importance of capturing, to the extent possible, the entirety of the construct of interest. Given my current research interests, I propose to undertake the following three categories of research to understand: (1)how the individual style; and (2) inter-group dynamics aspect of corporate governance play a role in corporate decision making and outcomes, and (3) to evaluate (and be able to make future recommendations) about the regulation of corporate governance. The overarching objective of this proposal is to expand our thinking of corporate governance to include the human element in the design of mechanisms and contracts.
Summary
The objective of this proposal is to apply for an ERC Starting Grant to support a careful study of the design and implications of corporate governance. Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that are designed to address the conflicts between the managers and owners of assets when there is a separation of ownership and control. These mechanisms are intended to monitor the person who has control over the assets so that the use of the assets does not conflict with the incentives of the owners of the assets. Boards of directors, institutional shareholders, and the market for corporate control are some examples of corporate governance mechanisms that are expected to mitigate the potential conflicts between owners and the managers. Based on the prior work of others and my own, I am convinced that an attempt to measure the role of the individual style and preferences in corporate decision making and corporate governance will be fruitful. The series of research I conducted so far developed my perspective as a researcher, making me appreciate better the importance of capturing, to the extent possible, the entirety of the construct of interest. Given my current research interests, I propose to undertake the following three categories of research to understand: (1)how the individual style; and (2) inter-group dynamics aspect of corporate governance play a role in corporate decision making and outcomes, and (3) to evaluate (and be able to make future recommendations) about the regulation of corporate governance. The overarching objective of this proposal is to expand our thinking of corporate governance to include the human element in the design of mechanisms and contracts.
Max ERC Funding
1 110 980 €
Duration
Start date: 2011-02-01, End date: 2016-01-31
Project acronym IFAP
Project Institutional Frictions in International Finance and Asset Pricing
Researcher (PI) Anna Pavlova
Host Institution (HI) LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2010-StG_20091209
Summary My project consists of three lines of work.
1. Incentives of Money Managers and Asset Pricing
The leading theories of asset pricing stipulate that prices in financial markets are determined by households who seek to optimise lifetime consumption (or by the so-called representative consumer ). This approach leaves no role for important institutional frictions such as, e.g., financial constraints and contract-induced incentives that played a major role in the 2008 crisis. An analysis of such frictions will add vastly to our understanding of how institutions make decisions and will also allow us to explore the implications of these decisions for asset prices. I propose to depart from the representative agent paradigm and introduce explicitly institutional investors into asset-pricing models. My goal is to understand how institutions affect financial markets and the real economy and to help develop appropriate policy responses.
2. International macro-finance
In the past two decades, economic globalisation has produced an unprecedented rise in cross-border equity holdings. Accounting for capital gains on these equity holdings, currently disregarded both in the official statistics and in traditional international macroeconomics, may potentially overturn implications and policy recommendations of the leading theories. In this project, I seek to enrich the field by incorporating explicitly portfolio choice and capital gains on financial assets. Such a theory marries two fields of research: international economics (Economics) and asset pricing (Finance).
3. Combining the above two areas
The 2008 crisis was sparked by banks and lead to a worldwide recession. Combining the insights from the first two projects, I intend to research how the instability spreads across countries and how incentives of institutions ought to be designed to limit the consequences of their actions for asset values and the real economy.
Summary
My project consists of three lines of work.
1. Incentives of Money Managers and Asset Pricing
The leading theories of asset pricing stipulate that prices in financial markets are determined by households who seek to optimise lifetime consumption (or by the so-called representative consumer ). This approach leaves no role for important institutional frictions such as, e.g., financial constraints and contract-induced incentives that played a major role in the 2008 crisis. An analysis of such frictions will add vastly to our understanding of how institutions make decisions and will also allow us to explore the implications of these decisions for asset prices. I propose to depart from the representative agent paradigm and introduce explicitly institutional investors into asset-pricing models. My goal is to understand how institutions affect financial markets and the real economy and to help develop appropriate policy responses.
2. International macro-finance
In the past two decades, economic globalisation has produced an unprecedented rise in cross-border equity holdings. Accounting for capital gains on these equity holdings, currently disregarded both in the official statistics and in traditional international macroeconomics, may potentially overturn implications and policy recommendations of the leading theories. In this project, I seek to enrich the field by incorporating explicitly portfolio choice and capital gains on financial assets. Such a theory marries two fields of research: international economics (Economics) and asset pricing (Finance).
3. Combining the above two areas
The 2008 crisis was sparked by banks and lead to a worldwide recession. Combining the insights from the first two projects, I intend to research how the instability spreads across countries and how incentives of institutions ought to be designed to limit the consequences of their actions for asset values and the real economy.
Max ERC Funding
925 910 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-11-01, End date: 2016-10-31
Project acronym IHKDC
Project Exiting long run poverty: the determinants of asset accumulation in developing countries
Researcher (PI) Orazio Pietro Attanasio
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2009-AdG
Summary We propose to study the determinants of the accumulation of productive assets among poor households in developing countries with a special, but not exclusive focus, on human capital. We plan to study how preferences, beliefs, information, expectations and available resources affect investment decisions, how these investment decisions are transformed in assets and how these assets can affect the material well being of poor households. We will also study how the availability (or lack thereof) of credit and insurance markets affects the accumulation of productive assets of poor households. An important part of our research is the construction, validation and use of innovative measurement tools. We plan to construct and use quantitative measures of beliefs, expectations, attitudes and preferences. We will be able to embed these measures in surveys being collected for the evaluation of a variety of policies and government programs in developing countries. The use of data from the evaluation of development policies has the additional advantage of capturing variation in resources and incentives that is introduced in an exogenous and controlled fashion. This allows the empirical identification of rich and credible structural models. The specific projects that make our research agenda will focus on three types of determinants: (i) preferences, perceptions, information and expectations; (ii) technology (how various inputs- investments- are converted into assets); (iii) resources and markets to access them. Estimation of these models will allow us to go beyond the simple estimation of the impacts of given policies, and shed light on the mechanisms and causal path that from individual perceptions, beliefs and expectations lead to investment choices and, eventually, to outcomes.
Summary
We propose to study the determinants of the accumulation of productive assets among poor households in developing countries with a special, but not exclusive focus, on human capital. We plan to study how preferences, beliefs, information, expectations and available resources affect investment decisions, how these investment decisions are transformed in assets and how these assets can affect the material well being of poor households. We will also study how the availability (or lack thereof) of credit and insurance markets affects the accumulation of productive assets of poor households. An important part of our research is the construction, validation and use of innovative measurement tools. We plan to construct and use quantitative measures of beliefs, expectations, attitudes and preferences. We will be able to embed these measures in surveys being collected for the evaluation of a variety of policies and government programs in developing countries. The use of data from the evaluation of development policies has the additional advantage of capturing variation in resources and incentives that is introduced in an exogenous and controlled fashion. This allows the empirical identification of rich and credible structural models. The specific projects that make our research agenda will focus on three types of determinants: (i) preferences, perceptions, information and expectations; (ii) technology (how various inputs- investments- are converted into assets); (iii) resources and markets to access them. Estimation of these models will allow us to go beyond the simple estimation of the impacts of given policies, and shed light on the mechanisms and causal path that from individual perceptions, beliefs and expectations lead to investment choices and, eventually, to outcomes.
Max ERC Funding
1 636 185 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-07-01, End date: 2013-12-31