Project acronym ABEP
Project Asset Bubbles and Economic Policy
Researcher (PI) Jaume Ventura Fontanet
Host Institution (HI) Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2009-AdG
Summary Advanced capitalist economies experience large and persistent movements in asset prices that are difficult to justify with economic fundamentals. The internet bubble of the 1990s and the real state market bubble of the 2000s are two recent examples. The predominant view is that these bubbles are a market failure, and are caused by some form of individual irrationality on the part of market participants. This project is based instead on the view that market participants are individually rational, although this does not preclude sometimes collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Bubbles are thus not a source of market failure by themselves but instead arise as a result of a pre-existing market failure, namely, the existence of pockets of dynamically inefficient investments. Under some conditions, bubbles partly solve this problem, increasing market efficiency and welfare. It is also possible however that bubbles do not solve the underlying problem and, in addition, create negative side-effects. The main objective of this project is to develop this view of asset bubbles, and produce an empirically-relevant macroeconomic framework that allows us to address the following questions: (i) What is the relationship between bubbles and financial market frictions? Special emphasis is given to how the globalization of financial markets and the development of new financial products affect the size and effects of bubbles. (ii) What is the relationship between bubbles, economic growth and unemployment? The theory suggests the presence of virtuous and vicious cycles, as economic growth creates the conditions for bubbles to pop up, while bubbles create incentives for economic growth to happen. (iii) What is the optimal policy to manage bubbles? We need to develop the tools that allow policy makers to sustain those bubbles that have positive effects and burst those that have negative effects.
Summary
Advanced capitalist economies experience large and persistent movements in asset prices that are difficult to justify with economic fundamentals. The internet bubble of the 1990s and the real state market bubble of the 2000s are two recent examples. The predominant view is that these bubbles are a market failure, and are caused by some form of individual irrationality on the part of market participants. This project is based instead on the view that market participants are individually rational, although this does not preclude sometimes collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Bubbles are thus not a source of market failure by themselves but instead arise as a result of a pre-existing market failure, namely, the existence of pockets of dynamically inefficient investments. Under some conditions, bubbles partly solve this problem, increasing market efficiency and welfare. It is also possible however that bubbles do not solve the underlying problem and, in addition, create negative side-effects. The main objective of this project is to develop this view of asset bubbles, and produce an empirically-relevant macroeconomic framework that allows us to address the following questions: (i) What is the relationship between bubbles and financial market frictions? Special emphasis is given to how the globalization of financial markets and the development of new financial products affect the size and effects of bubbles. (ii) What is the relationship between bubbles, economic growth and unemployment? The theory suggests the presence of virtuous and vicious cycles, as economic growth creates the conditions for bubbles to pop up, while bubbles create incentives for economic growth to happen. (iii) What is the optimal policy to manage bubbles? We need to develop the tools that allow policy makers to sustain those bubbles that have positive effects and burst those that have negative effects.
Max ERC Funding
1 000 000 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-04-01, End date: 2015-03-31
Project acronym APMPAL
Project Asset Prices and Macro Policy when Agents Learn
Researcher (PI) Albert Marcet Torrens
Host Institution (HI) FUNDACIÓ MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS AND VOTES IN ECONOMICS
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2012-ADG_20120411
Summary "A conventional assumption in dynamic models is that agents form their expectations in a very sophisticated manner. In particular, that they have Rational Expectations (RE). We develop some tools to relax this assumption while retaining fully optimal behaviour by agents. We study implications for asset pricing and macro policy.
We assume that agents have a consistent set of beliefs that is close, but not equal, to RE. Agents are ""Internally Rational"", that is, they behave rationally given their system of beliefs. Thus, it is conceptually a small deviation from RE. It provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning, since the learning algorithm is determined by agents’ optimal behaviour. In previous work we have shown that this framework can match stock price and housing price fluctuations, and that policy implications are quite different.
In this project we intend to: i) develop further the foundations of internally rational (IR) learning, ii) apply this to explain observed asset price price behavior, such as stock prices, bond prices, inflation, commodity derivatives, and exchange rates, iii) extend the IR framework to the case when agents entertain various models, iv) optimal policy under IR learning and under private information when some hidden shocks are not revealed ex-post. Along the way we will address policy issues such as: effects of creating derivative markets, sovereign spread as a signal of sovereign default risk, tests of fiscal sustainability, fiscal policy when agents learn, monetary policy (more specifically, QE measures and interest rate policy), and the role of credibility in macro policy."
Summary
"A conventional assumption in dynamic models is that agents form their expectations in a very sophisticated manner. In particular, that they have Rational Expectations (RE). We develop some tools to relax this assumption while retaining fully optimal behaviour by agents. We study implications for asset pricing and macro policy.
We assume that agents have a consistent set of beliefs that is close, but not equal, to RE. Agents are ""Internally Rational"", that is, they behave rationally given their system of beliefs. Thus, it is conceptually a small deviation from RE. It provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning, since the learning algorithm is determined by agents’ optimal behaviour. In previous work we have shown that this framework can match stock price and housing price fluctuations, and that policy implications are quite different.
In this project we intend to: i) develop further the foundations of internally rational (IR) learning, ii) apply this to explain observed asset price price behavior, such as stock prices, bond prices, inflation, commodity derivatives, and exchange rates, iii) extend the IR framework to the case when agents entertain various models, iv) optimal policy under IR learning and under private information when some hidden shocks are not revealed ex-post. Along the way we will address policy issues such as: effects of creating derivative markets, sovereign spread as a signal of sovereign default risk, tests of fiscal sustainability, fiscal policy when agents learn, monetary policy (more specifically, QE measures and interest rate policy), and the role of credibility in macro policy."
Max ERC Funding
1 970 260 €
Duration
Start date: 2013-06-01, End date: 2018-08-31
Project acronym APMPAL-HET
Project Asset Prices and Macro Policy when Agents Learn and are Heterogeneous
Researcher (PI) Albert MARCET TORRENS
Host Institution (HI) FUNDACIÓ MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS AND VOTES IN ECONOMICS
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2017-ADG
Summary Based on the APMPAL (ERC) project we continue to develop the frameworks of internal rationality (IR) and optimal signal extraction (OSE). Under IR investors/consumers behave rationally given their subjective beliefs about prices, these beliefs are compatible with data. Under OSE the government has partial information, it knows how policy influences observed variables and signal extraction.
We develop further the foundations of IR and OSE with an emphasis on heterogeneous agents. We study sovereign bond crisis and heterogeneity of beliefs in asset pricing models under IR, using survey data on expectations. Under IR the assets’ stochastic discount factor depends on the agents’ decision function and beliefs; this modifies some key asset pricing results. We extend OSE to models with state variables, forward-looking constraints and heterogeneity.
Under IR agents’ prior beliefs determine the effects of a policy reform. If the government does not observe prior beliefs it has partial information, thus OSE should be used to analyse policy reforms under IR.
If IR heterogeneous workers forecast their productivity either from their own wage or their neighbours’ in a network, low current wages discourage search and human capital accumulation, leading to low productivity. This can explain low development of a country or social exclusion of a group. Worker subsidies redistribute wealth and can increase productivity if they “teach” agents to exit a low-wage state.
We build DSGE models under IR for prediction and policy analysis. We develop time-series tools for predicting macro and asset market variables, using information available to the analyst, and we introduce non-linearities and survey expectations using insights from models under IR.
We study how IR and OSE change the view on macro policy issues such as tax smoothing, debt management, Taylor rule, level of inflation, fiscal/monetary policy coordination, factor taxation or redistribution.
Summary
Based on the APMPAL (ERC) project we continue to develop the frameworks of internal rationality (IR) and optimal signal extraction (OSE). Under IR investors/consumers behave rationally given their subjective beliefs about prices, these beliefs are compatible with data. Under OSE the government has partial information, it knows how policy influences observed variables and signal extraction.
We develop further the foundations of IR and OSE with an emphasis on heterogeneous agents. We study sovereign bond crisis and heterogeneity of beliefs in asset pricing models under IR, using survey data on expectations. Under IR the assets’ stochastic discount factor depends on the agents’ decision function and beliefs; this modifies some key asset pricing results. We extend OSE to models with state variables, forward-looking constraints and heterogeneity.
Under IR agents’ prior beliefs determine the effects of a policy reform. If the government does not observe prior beliefs it has partial information, thus OSE should be used to analyse policy reforms under IR.
If IR heterogeneous workers forecast their productivity either from their own wage or their neighbours’ in a network, low current wages discourage search and human capital accumulation, leading to low productivity. This can explain low development of a country or social exclusion of a group. Worker subsidies redistribute wealth and can increase productivity if they “teach” agents to exit a low-wage state.
We build DSGE models under IR for prediction and policy analysis. We develop time-series tools for predicting macro and asset market variables, using information available to the analyst, and we introduce non-linearities and survey expectations using insights from models under IR.
We study how IR and OSE change the view on macro policy issues such as tax smoothing, debt management, Taylor rule, level of inflation, fiscal/monetary policy coordination, factor taxation or redistribution.
Max ERC Funding
1 524 144 €
Duration
Start date: 2018-09-01, End date: 2023-08-31
Project acronym ASNODEV
Project Aspirations Social Norms and Development
Researcher (PI) Eliana LA FERRARA
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITA COMMERCIALE LUIGI BOCCONI
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2015-AdG
Summary Development economists and policymakers often face scenarios in which poor people do not make choices that would help them get out of poverty due to an “aspiration failure”: the poor perceive certain goals as unattainable and do not invest towards those goals, thus perpetuating their own state of poverty. The aim of this proposal is to improve our understanding of the relationship between aspirations and socio-economic outcomes of disadvantaged individuals, in order to answer the question: Can we design policy interventions that shift aspirations in a way that is conducive to development?
In addressing the above question a fundamental role is played by social norms and by the ability of individuals to coordinate on “new” aspirations, hence the analysis of social effects is a salient feature of this proposal.
The proposed research is organized in two workpackages. The first focuses on the media as a vehicle for changing aspirations, examining both commercial TV programs and “educational entertainment”. The second workpackage examines “tailored” interventions designed to address specific determinants of aspiration failures (e.g., psychological support to reduce perceived barriers; inter-racial interaction to change stereotypes; institutional reform to strengthen women’s rights and reduce the gender aspiration gap).
The methodology will involve rigorous evaluation of several interventions directly designed to or indirectly affecting aspirations and social norms. Original data collected through survey work, large administrative datasets and media content analysis will be used.
The results of this project will advance our knowledge on the sources of aspiration failures by poor people and on the interplay between aspirations and social norms, eventually opening the avenue for a new array of anti-poverty policies.
Summary
Development economists and policymakers often face scenarios in which poor people do not make choices that would help them get out of poverty due to an “aspiration failure”: the poor perceive certain goals as unattainable and do not invest towards those goals, thus perpetuating their own state of poverty. The aim of this proposal is to improve our understanding of the relationship between aspirations and socio-economic outcomes of disadvantaged individuals, in order to answer the question: Can we design policy interventions that shift aspirations in a way that is conducive to development?
In addressing the above question a fundamental role is played by social norms and by the ability of individuals to coordinate on “new” aspirations, hence the analysis of social effects is a salient feature of this proposal.
The proposed research is organized in two workpackages. The first focuses on the media as a vehicle for changing aspirations, examining both commercial TV programs and “educational entertainment”. The second workpackage examines “tailored” interventions designed to address specific determinants of aspiration failures (e.g., psychological support to reduce perceived barriers; inter-racial interaction to change stereotypes; institutional reform to strengthen women’s rights and reduce the gender aspiration gap).
The methodology will involve rigorous evaluation of several interventions directly designed to or indirectly affecting aspirations and social norms. Original data collected through survey work, large administrative datasets and media content analysis will be used.
The results of this project will advance our knowledge on the sources of aspiration failures by poor people and on the interplay between aspirations and social norms, eventually opening the avenue for a new array of anti-poverty policies.
Max ERC Funding
1 618 125 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-11-01, End date: 2021-10-31
Project acronym BAYNET
Project Bayesian Networks and Non-Rational Expectations
Researcher (PI) Ran SPIEGLER
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2015-AdG
Summary "This project will develop a new framework for modeling economic agents having ""boundedly rational expectations"" (BRE). It is based on the concept of Bayesian networks (more generally, graphical models), borrowed from statistics and AI. In the framework's basic version, an agent is characterized by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of all relevant random variables. The DAG is the agent's ""type"" – it represents how he systematically distorts any objective probability distribution into a subjective belief. Technically, the distortion takes the form of the standard Bayesian-network factorization formula given by the agent's DAG. The agent's choice is modeled as a ""personal equilibrium"", because his subjective belief regarding the implications of his actions can vary with his own long-run behavior. The DAG representation unifies and simplifies existing models of BRE, subsuming them as special cases corresponding to distinct graphical representations. It captures hitherto-unmodeled fallacies such as reverse causation. The framework facilitates behavioral characterizations of general classes of models of BRE and expands their applicability. I will demonstrate this with applications to monetary policy, behavioral I.O., asset pricing, etc. I will extend the basic formalism to multi-agent environments, addressing issues beyond the reach of current models of BRE (e.g., formalizing the notion of ""high-order"" limited understanding of statistical regularities). Finally, I will seek a learning foundation for the graphical representation of BRE, in the sense that it will capture how the agent extrapolates his belief from a dataset (drawn from the objective distribution) containing ""missing values"", via some intuitive ""imputation method"". This part, too, borrows ideas from statistics and AI, further demonstrating the project's interdisciplinary nature."
Summary
"This project will develop a new framework for modeling economic agents having ""boundedly rational expectations"" (BRE). It is based on the concept of Bayesian networks (more generally, graphical models), borrowed from statistics and AI. In the framework's basic version, an agent is characterized by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of all relevant random variables. The DAG is the agent's ""type"" – it represents how he systematically distorts any objective probability distribution into a subjective belief. Technically, the distortion takes the form of the standard Bayesian-network factorization formula given by the agent's DAG. The agent's choice is modeled as a ""personal equilibrium"", because his subjective belief regarding the implications of his actions can vary with his own long-run behavior. The DAG representation unifies and simplifies existing models of BRE, subsuming them as special cases corresponding to distinct graphical representations. It captures hitherto-unmodeled fallacies such as reverse causation. The framework facilitates behavioral characterizations of general classes of models of BRE and expands their applicability. I will demonstrate this with applications to monetary policy, behavioral I.O., asset pricing, etc. I will extend the basic formalism to multi-agent environments, addressing issues beyond the reach of current models of BRE (e.g., formalizing the notion of ""high-order"" limited understanding of statistical regularities). Finally, I will seek a learning foundation for the graphical representation of BRE, in the sense that it will capture how the agent extrapolates his belief from a dataset (drawn from the objective distribution) containing ""missing values"", via some intuitive ""imputation method"". This part, too, borrows ideas from statistics and AI, further demonstrating the project's interdisciplinary nature."
Max ERC Funding
1 379 288 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-07-01, End date: 2021-06-30
Project acronym BESTDECISION
Project "Behavioural Economics and Strategic Decision Making: Theory, Empirics, and Experiments"
Researcher (PI) Vincent Paul Crawford
Host Institution (HI) THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2013-ADG
Summary "I will study questions of central microeconomic importance via interwoven theoretical, empirical, and experimental analyses, from a behavioural perspective combining standard methods with assumptions that better reflect evidence on behaviour and psychological insights. The contributions of behavioural economics have been widely recognized, but the benefits of its insights are far from fully realized. I propose four lines of inquiry that focus on how institutions interact with cognition and behaviour, chosen for their potential to reshape our understanding of important questions and their synergies across lines.
The first line will study nonparametric identification and estimation of reference-dependent versions of the standard microeconomic model of consumer demand or labour supply, the subject of hundreds of empirical studies and perhaps the single most important model in microeconomics. It will allow such studies to consider relevant behavioural factors without imposing structural assumptions as in previous work.
The second line will analyze history-dependent learning in financial crises theoretically and experimentally, with the goal of quantifying how market structure influences the likelihood of a crisis.
The third line will study strategic thinking experimentally, using a powerful new design that links subjects’ searches for hidden payoff information (“eye-movements”) much more directly to thinking.
The fourth line will significantly advance Myerson and Satterthwaite’s analyses of optimal design of bargaining rules and auctions, which first went beyond the analysis of given institutions to study what is possible by designing new institutions, replacing their equilibrium assumption with a nonequilibrium model that is well supported by experiments.
The synergies among these four lines’ theoretical analyses, empirical methods, and data analyses will accelerate progress on each line well beyond what would be possible in a piecemeal approach."
Summary
"I will study questions of central microeconomic importance via interwoven theoretical, empirical, and experimental analyses, from a behavioural perspective combining standard methods with assumptions that better reflect evidence on behaviour and psychological insights. The contributions of behavioural economics have been widely recognized, but the benefits of its insights are far from fully realized. I propose four lines of inquiry that focus on how institutions interact with cognition and behaviour, chosen for their potential to reshape our understanding of important questions and their synergies across lines.
The first line will study nonparametric identification and estimation of reference-dependent versions of the standard microeconomic model of consumer demand or labour supply, the subject of hundreds of empirical studies and perhaps the single most important model in microeconomics. It will allow such studies to consider relevant behavioural factors without imposing structural assumptions as in previous work.
The second line will analyze history-dependent learning in financial crises theoretically and experimentally, with the goal of quantifying how market structure influences the likelihood of a crisis.
The third line will study strategic thinking experimentally, using a powerful new design that links subjects’ searches for hidden payoff information (“eye-movements”) much more directly to thinking.
The fourth line will significantly advance Myerson and Satterthwaite’s analyses of optimal design of bargaining rules and auctions, which first went beyond the analysis of given institutions to study what is possible by designing new institutions, replacing their equilibrium assumption with a nonequilibrium model that is well supported by experiments.
The synergies among these four lines’ theoretical analyses, empirical methods, and data analyses will accelerate progress on each line well beyond what would be possible in a piecemeal approach."
Max ERC Funding
1 985 373 €
Duration
Start date: 2014-04-01, End date: 2019-03-31
Project acronym BRIO
Project Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization
Researcher (PI) Ran Spiegler
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2008-AdG
Summary "Economists' modern understanding of the functioning of markets is based on the behavioral assumption of individual rationality. Market agents are assumed to hold well-defined preferences and have perfect ability to draw Bayesian inferences in accordance with correct knowledge of the market model and market equilibrium. This research proposal is based on the premise that bounded rationality on the part of consumers is potentially a major source of market friction. My objective is to develop general theoretical tools to investigate this intuition, and to examine whether these tools can be insightfully applied to realistic market settings. So far, the literature on the subject has progressed as a sequence of specific models that capture one aspect of consumer psychology at a time. The challenge is to synthesize and generalize these models into flexible theoretical frameworks for modelling market interaction between profit-maximizing firms and boundedly rational consumers. Hopefully, various aspects of consumer psychology can be embedded into these frameworks, so that analytic results can be stated in terms of general, abstract properties of consumer behavior, rather than in terms of specific psychological effects. In turn, this general analysis is expected to lead to novel applications. Here are some of the general questions that I hope to address. Can we view certain aspects of firms' pricing and marketing strategies as responses to consumers' bounded rationality? To what extent are boundedly rational consumers vulnerable to exploitation by firms? Does competition protect them from exploitation? Does interaction between firms and boundedly rational consumers give rise to inefficiencies, and how are these affected by competition? What is the impact of various regulatory interventions in this context? Do market forces lead firms to ""educate"" or ""debias"" boundedly rational consumers? Does greater consumer rationality imply more competitive industry profits?"
Summary
"Economists' modern understanding of the functioning of markets is based on the behavioral assumption of individual rationality. Market agents are assumed to hold well-defined preferences and have perfect ability to draw Bayesian inferences in accordance with correct knowledge of the market model and market equilibrium. This research proposal is based on the premise that bounded rationality on the part of consumers is potentially a major source of market friction. My objective is to develop general theoretical tools to investigate this intuition, and to examine whether these tools can be insightfully applied to realistic market settings. So far, the literature on the subject has progressed as a sequence of specific models that capture one aspect of consumer psychology at a time. The challenge is to synthesize and generalize these models into flexible theoretical frameworks for modelling market interaction between profit-maximizing firms and boundedly rational consumers. Hopefully, various aspects of consumer psychology can be embedded into these frameworks, so that analytic results can be stated in terms of general, abstract properties of consumer behavior, rather than in terms of specific psychological effects. In turn, this general analysis is expected to lead to novel applications. Here are some of the general questions that I hope to address. Can we view certain aspects of firms' pricing and marketing strategies as responses to consumers' bounded rationality? To what extent are boundedly rational consumers vulnerable to exploitation by firms? Does competition protect them from exploitation? Does interaction between firms and boundedly rational consumers give rise to inefficiencies, and how are these affected by competition? What is the impact of various regulatory interventions in this context? Do market forces lead firms to ""educate"" or ""debias"" boundedly rational consumers? Does greater consumer rationality imply more competitive industry profits?"
Max ERC Funding
1 098 637 €
Duration
Start date: 2008-11-01, End date: 2014-10-31
Project acronym BRSCDP-TEA
Project Bounded rationality and social concerns in decision processes: theory, experiments, and applications
Researcher (PI) Massimo Marinacci
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITA COMMERCIALE LUIGI BOCCONI
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2008-AdG
Summary In the field of economics, individual decision making is the basic building block for studying complex environments such as markets, political systems, and social dynamics. Individual decision making is embodied in the neoclassical economically rational agent, whose only concern is the maximization of utility from his own material consumption. Two qualities of this agent are especially important for the research we will undertake: He has perfect understanding of the problems he faces - today and in the future - and unbounded computational ability to solve them. He also has no regard for the consumption of other members of the society or for their feelings about his actions. Huge empirical and experimental evidence shows that departure from these qualities is robust and significant. The failure of the existing models to incorporate bounded rationality and social concerns has proven critical in socially relevant and complex situations such as lifetime consumption and saving, taxation and expenditure policy, labour search and wage determination. The objective of this project is to bring these phenomena into the framework of neoclassical economics, to test their implications, and to tackle important applications. A novel and central feature of our approach is the attempt to retain the parsimonious methodological approach of economic modelling, which has scored groundbreaking successes in matters such as the design of auctions, markets, contracts, and voting mechanisms. Our project envisions the development of theory on individual decision making, the use of experiments to illuminate and test the theory, and the concrete application of theory - mainly to financial markets. The project will push the frontiers of the understanding of the above mentioned socially relevant situations. The explanatory power of our approach will be guaranteed by the continuous feed-back between theory and evidence- experimental and neuroexperimental, and by a departure from ad hoc modelling.
Summary
In the field of economics, individual decision making is the basic building block for studying complex environments such as markets, political systems, and social dynamics. Individual decision making is embodied in the neoclassical economically rational agent, whose only concern is the maximization of utility from his own material consumption. Two qualities of this agent are especially important for the research we will undertake: He has perfect understanding of the problems he faces - today and in the future - and unbounded computational ability to solve them. He also has no regard for the consumption of other members of the society or for their feelings about his actions. Huge empirical and experimental evidence shows that departure from these qualities is robust and significant. The failure of the existing models to incorporate bounded rationality and social concerns has proven critical in socially relevant and complex situations such as lifetime consumption and saving, taxation and expenditure policy, labour search and wage determination. The objective of this project is to bring these phenomena into the framework of neoclassical economics, to test their implications, and to tackle important applications. A novel and central feature of our approach is the attempt to retain the parsimonious methodological approach of economic modelling, which has scored groundbreaking successes in matters such as the design of auctions, markets, contracts, and voting mechanisms. Our project envisions the development of theory on individual decision making, the use of experiments to illuminate and test the theory, and the concrete application of theory - mainly to financial markets. The project will push the frontiers of the understanding of the above mentioned socially relevant situations. The explanatory power of our approach will be guaranteed by the continuous feed-back between theory and evidence- experimental and neuroexperimental, and by a departure from ad hoc modelling.
Max ERC Funding
1 399 800 €
Duration
Start date: 2009-01-01, End date: 2013-12-31
Project acronym BUBPOL
Project Monetary Policy and Asset Price Bubbles
Researcher (PI) Jordi Galí Garreta
Host Institution (HI) Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2013-ADG
Summary "The proposed research project seeks to further our understanding on two important questions for the design of monetary policy:
(a) What are the effects of monetary policy interventions on asset price bubbles?
(b) How should monetary policy be conducted in the presence of asset price bubbles?
The first part of the project will focus on the development of a theoretical framework that can be used to analyze rigorously the implications of alternative monetary policy rules in the presence of asset price bubbles, and to characterize the optimal monetary policy. In particular, I plan to use such a framework to assess the merits of a “leaning against the wind” strategy, which calls for a systematic rise in interest rates in response to the development of a bubble.
The second part of the project will seek to produce evidence, both empirical and experimental, regarding the effects of monetary policy on asset price bubbles. The empirical evidence will seek to identify and estimate the sign and response of asset price bubbles to interest rate changes, exploiting the potential differences in the joint behavior of interest rates and asset prices during “bubbly” episodes, in comparison to “normal” times. In addition, I plan to conduct some lab experiments in order to shed some light on the link between monetary policy and bubbles. Participants will trade two assets, a one-period riskless asset and a long-lived stock, in an environment consistent with the existence of asset price bubbles in equilibrium. Monetary policy interventions will take the form of changes in the short-term interest rate, engineered by the experimenter. The experiments will allow us to evaluate some of the predictions of the theoretical models regarding the impact of monetary policy on the dynamics of bubbles, as well as the effectiveness of “leaning against the wind” policies."
Summary
"The proposed research project seeks to further our understanding on two important questions for the design of monetary policy:
(a) What are the effects of monetary policy interventions on asset price bubbles?
(b) How should monetary policy be conducted in the presence of asset price bubbles?
The first part of the project will focus on the development of a theoretical framework that can be used to analyze rigorously the implications of alternative monetary policy rules in the presence of asset price bubbles, and to characterize the optimal monetary policy. In particular, I plan to use such a framework to assess the merits of a “leaning against the wind” strategy, which calls for a systematic rise in interest rates in response to the development of a bubble.
The second part of the project will seek to produce evidence, both empirical and experimental, regarding the effects of monetary policy on asset price bubbles. The empirical evidence will seek to identify and estimate the sign and response of asset price bubbles to interest rate changes, exploiting the potential differences in the joint behavior of interest rates and asset prices during “bubbly” episodes, in comparison to “normal” times. In addition, I plan to conduct some lab experiments in order to shed some light on the link between monetary policy and bubbles. Participants will trade two assets, a one-period riskless asset and a long-lived stock, in an environment consistent with the existence of asset price bubbles in equilibrium. Monetary policy interventions will take the form of changes in the short-term interest rate, engineered by the experimenter. The experiments will allow us to evaluate some of the predictions of the theoretical models regarding the impact of monetary policy on the dynamics of bubbles, as well as the effectiveness of “leaning against the wind” policies."
Max ERC Funding
799 200 €
Duration
Start date: 2014-01-01, End date: 2017-12-31
Project acronym COGNITION
Project Cognition and Decision-Making: Laws, Norms and Contracts
Researcher (PI) Jean Tirole
Host Institution (HI) FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES
Call Details Advanced Grant (AdG), SH1, ERC-2009-AdG
Summary The application's unifying theme is cognition. Any decision reflects the information that comes to the decision-maker's awareness at the moment of making the decision. In turn, this information is the stochastic outcome of a sequence of more or less conscious choices and of awareness manipulation by third parties. The three parts of this application all are concerned with two factors of limited awareness (cognitive costs and motivated beliefs) and with the application of imperfect cognition to economics. The various projects can be subsumed into three themes, each with different subprojects: 1. Self-serving beliefs, laws, norms and taboos (expressive function of the law, taboos, dignity and contracts). 2. Cognition, markets, and contracts (mechanism design under costly cognition, directing attention in markets and politics). 3. Cognition and individual decision-making (foundations of some non-standard preferences). The methodology for this research will be that of formal economic modeling and welfare analysis, enriched with important insights from psychology and sociology. It will also include experimental (laboratory) investigations. The output will first take the form of a series of articles in economics journals, as well as, for the research described in Part 1, a book to disseminate the research to broader, multidisciplinary and non-specialized audiences.
Summary
The application's unifying theme is cognition. Any decision reflects the information that comes to the decision-maker's awareness at the moment of making the decision. In turn, this information is the stochastic outcome of a sequence of more or less conscious choices and of awareness manipulation by third parties. The three parts of this application all are concerned with two factors of limited awareness (cognitive costs and motivated beliefs) and with the application of imperfect cognition to economics. The various projects can be subsumed into three themes, each with different subprojects: 1. Self-serving beliefs, laws, norms and taboos (expressive function of the law, taboos, dignity and contracts). 2. Cognition, markets, and contracts (mechanism design under costly cognition, directing attention in markets and politics). 3. Cognition and individual decision-making (foundations of some non-standard preferences). The methodology for this research will be that of formal economic modeling and welfare analysis, enriched with important insights from psychology and sociology. It will also include experimental (laboratory) investigations. The output will first take the form of a series of articles in economics journals, as well as, for the research described in Part 1, a book to disseminate the research to broader, multidisciplinary and non-specialized audiences.
Max ERC Funding
1 910 400 €
Duration
Start date: 2010-04-01, End date: 2016-03-31