Project acronym ATTENTION
Project Economics of Inattention
Researcher (PI) Filip Matejka
Host Institution (HI) NARODOHOSPODARSKY USTAV AKADEMIE VED CESKE REPUBLIKY VEREJNA VYZKUMNA INSTITUCE
Country Czechia
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2020-COG
Summary This proposal outlines an agenda that aims to improve our understanding of economies with inattentive agents. Attention to detail, not only to current news, but also to how the world works in general, is central to how we interact with the environment.
In the first part of the agenda, we will study how agents come up with the simplified mental models they use in their decision-making. The aim is to provide a new alternative to rational expectations. We will address the question of endogenous model uncertainty by sidestepping the largely statistical nature of previous work. Our agents learn about a model directly, i.e., all information on the details of the correct model is readily available. The envisioned implications can speak to issues such as the expectations formation and formation of narratives, polarization of opinions, and demand for public policy.
In the second part, we will study how a government optimally intervenes in markets if it finds it costly to get the necessary information. On one hand, a government does not possess the local information of decentralized markets. On the other, markets on their own often generate suboptimal social outcomes. We will explore what information the government should collect, how to use it for regulation, and when instead it should leave markets unaffected.
In the third part, we will leverage recent theories of attention allocation and use uniquely detailed data on attention and treatment choices by hospital personnel (including physicians and nurses). This will allow us to explore in more detail than before what theories describe realistic choices well. Moreover, we will eventually aim at a very practical goal: how to help clinicians decrease their cognitive load and improve medical choices.
Summary
This proposal outlines an agenda that aims to improve our understanding of economies with inattentive agents. Attention to detail, not only to current news, but also to how the world works in general, is central to how we interact with the environment.
In the first part of the agenda, we will study how agents come up with the simplified mental models they use in their decision-making. The aim is to provide a new alternative to rational expectations. We will address the question of endogenous model uncertainty by sidestepping the largely statistical nature of previous work. Our agents learn about a model directly, i.e., all information on the details of the correct model is readily available. The envisioned implications can speak to issues such as the expectations formation and formation of narratives, polarization of opinions, and demand for public policy.
In the second part, we will study how a government optimally intervenes in markets if it finds it costly to get the necessary information. On one hand, a government does not possess the local information of decentralized markets. On the other, markets on their own often generate suboptimal social outcomes. We will explore what information the government should collect, how to use it for regulation, and when instead it should leave markets unaffected.
In the third part, we will leverage recent theories of attention allocation and use uniquely detailed data on attention and treatment choices by hospital personnel (including physicians and nurses). This will allow us to explore in more detail than before what theories describe realistic choices well. Moreover, we will eventually aim at a very practical goal: how to help clinicians decrease their cognitive load and improve medical choices.
Max ERC Funding
1 162 664 €
Duration
Start date: 2021-04-01, End date: 2026-03-31
Project acronym BEHAVFRICTIONS
Project Behavioral Implications of Information-Processing Frictions
Researcher (PI) Jakub STEINER
Host Institution (HI) NARODOHOSPODARSKY USTAV AKADEMIE VED CESKE REPUBLIKY VEREJNA VYZKUMNA INSTITUCE
Country Czechia
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2017-COG
Summary BEHAVFRICTIONS will use novel models focussing on information-processing frictions to explain choice patterns described in behavioral economics and psychology. The proposed research will provide microfoundations that are essential for (i) identification of stable preferences, (ii) counterfactual predictions, and (iii) normative conclusions.
(i) Agents who face information-processing costs must trade the precision of choice against information costs. Their behavior thus reflects both their stable preferences and the context-dependent procedures that manage their errors stemming from imperfect information processing. In the absence of micro-founded models, the two drivers of the behavior are difficult to disentangle for outside observers. In some pillars of the proposal, the agents follow choice rules that closely resemble logit rules used in structural estimation. This will allow me to reinterpret the structural estimation fits to choice data and to make a distinction between the stable preferences and frictions.
(ii) Such a distinction is important in counterfactual policy analysis because the second-best decision procedures that manage the errors in choice are affected by the analysed policy. Incorporation of the information-processing frictions into existing empirical methods will improve our ability to predict effects of the policies.
(iii) My preliminary results suggest that when an agent is prone to committing errors, biases--such as overconfidence, confirmatory bias, or perception biases known from prospect theory--arise under second-best strategies. By providing the link between the agent's environment and the second-best distribution of the perception errors, my models will delineate environments in which these biases shield the agents from the most costly mistakes from environments in which the biases turn into maladaptations. The distinction will inform the normative debate on debiasing.
Summary
BEHAVFRICTIONS will use novel models focussing on information-processing frictions to explain choice patterns described in behavioral economics and psychology. The proposed research will provide microfoundations that are essential for (i) identification of stable preferences, (ii) counterfactual predictions, and (iii) normative conclusions.
(i) Agents who face information-processing costs must trade the precision of choice against information costs. Their behavior thus reflects both their stable preferences and the context-dependent procedures that manage their errors stemming from imperfect information processing. In the absence of micro-founded models, the two drivers of the behavior are difficult to disentangle for outside observers. In some pillars of the proposal, the agents follow choice rules that closely resemble logit rules used in structural estimation. This will allow me to reinterpret the structural estimation fits to choice data and to make a distinction between the stable preferences and frictions.
(ii) Such a distinction is important in counterfactual policy analysis because the second-best decision procedures that manage the errors in choice are affected by the analysed policy. Incorporation of the information-processing frictions into existing empirical methods will improve our ability to predict effects of the policies.
(iii) My preliminary results suggest that when an agent is prone to committing errors, biases--such as overconfidence, confirmatory bias, or perception biases known from prospect theory--arise under second-best strategies. By providing the link between the agent's environment and the second-best distribution of the perception errors, my models will delineate environments in which these biases shield the agents from the most costly mistakes from environments in which the biases turn into maladaptations. The distinction will inform the normative debate on debiasing.
Max ERC Funding
1 321 488 €
Duration
Start date: 2018-06-01, End date: 2023-05-31
Project acronym BPI
Project Bayesian Peer Influence: Group Beliefs, Polarisation and Segregation
Researcher (PI) Gilat Levy
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Country United Kingdom
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2015-CoG
Summary "The objective of this research agenda is to provide a new framework to model and analyze dynamics of group beliefs, in order to study phenomena such as group polarization, segregation and inter-group discrimination. We introduce a simple new heuristic, the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic (BPI), which is based on rational foundations and captures how individuals are influenced by others' beliefs. We will explore the theoretical properties of this heuristic, and apply the model to analyze the implications of belief dynamics on social interactions.
Understanding the formation and evolution of beliefs in groups is an important aspect of many economic applications, such as labour market discrimination. The beliefs that different groups of people have about members of other groups should be central to any theory or empirical investigation of this topic. At the same time, economic models of segregation and discrimination typically do not focus on the evolution and dynamics of group beliefs that allow for such phenomena. There is therefore a need for new tools of analysis for incorporating the dynamics of group beliefs; this is particularly important in order to understand the full implications of policy interventions which often intend to ""educate the public''. The BPI fills this gap in the literature by offering a tractable and natural heuristic for group communication.
Our aim is to study the theoretical properties of the BPI, as well as its applications to the dynamics of group behavior. Our plan is to: (i) Analyze rational learning from others’ beliefs and characterise the BPI. (ii) Use the BPI to account for cognitive biases in information processing. (iii) Use the BPI to analyze the diffusion of beliefs in social networks. (iv) Apply the BPI to understand the relation between belief polarization, segregation in education and labour market discrimination. (v) Apply the BPI to understand the relation between belief polarization and political outcomes."
Summary
"The objective of this research agenda is to provide a new framework to model and analyze dynamics of group beliefs, in order to study phenomena such as group polarization, segregation and inter-group discrimination. We introduce a simple new heuristic, the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic (BPI), which is based on rational foundations and captures how individuals are influenced by others' beliefs. We will explore the theoretical properties of this heuristic, and apply the model to analyze the implications of belief dynamics on social interactions.
Understanding the formation and evolution of beliefs in groups is an important aspect of many economic applications, such as labour market discrimination. The beliefs that different groups of people have about members of other groups should be central to any theory or empirical investigation of this topic. At the same time, economic models of segregation and discrimination typically do not focus on the evolution and dynamics of group beliefs that allow for such phenomena. There is therefore a need for new tools of analysis for incorporating the dynamics of group beliefs; this is particularly important in order to understand the full implications of policy interventions which often intend to ""educate the public''. The BPI fills this gap in the literature by offering a tractable and natural heuristic for group communication.
Our aim is to study the theoretical properties of the BPI, as well as its applications to the dynamics of group behavior. Our plan is to: (i) Analyze rational learning from others’ beliefs and characterise the BPI. (ii) Use the BPI to account for cognitive biases in information processing. (iii) Use the BPI to analyze the diffusion of beliefs in social networks. (iv) Apply the BPI to understand the relation between belief polarization, segregation in education and labour market discrimination. (v) Apply the BPI to understand the relation between belief polarization and political outcomes."
Max ERC Funding
1 662 942 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-08-01, End date: 2022-01-31
Project acronym CLEAN
Project Clean evidence on dirty deeds
Researcher (PI) Paolo PINOTTI
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITA COMMERCIALE LUIGI BOCCONI
Country Italy
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2019-COG
Summary Organized crime is systematically associated with lower economic development and higher corruption, political instability and political violence across countries. However, causal evidence on the economic and political effects of organized crime remains limited.
The present proposal advances our knowledge of organized crime in two main directions. First, I will explore the effects of organized crime on the allocation and effectiveness of public spending, focusing on two important areas of government spending: public procurement and public subsidies to private firms. This analysis will advance our knowledge of the practices through which captured politicians can distort the allocation of resources in favour of criminal organizations, their implications for the efficiency of government intervention, and the effectiveness of alternative policy responses.
Second, whilst previous research has focused almost exclusively on the traditional areas of origin of criminal organizations, I will study the effects of criminal groups moving to new regions and countries. I will focus in particular on three different contexts: i) the “transplant” of criminal organizations from southern to northern Italian regions; ii) interactions of immigrants and natives in criminal activity in the wake of recent migration to the Netherlands; and iii) the inflow of members of the Sicilian Mafia into the US during the period of alcohol prohibition (1920-1933). The present proposal will advance our understanding of how criminal groups can relocate to new regions and countries; their interactions with the criminal groups that may already be present there; and the economic and social effects in the areas of destination. From a methodological perspective, all projects will take advantage of unique micro-level data and state-of-the-art econometric methods for impact evaluation to provide clean evidence on causal relationships.
Summary
Organized crime is systematically associated with lower economic development and higher corruption, political instability and political violence across countries. However, causal evidence on the economic and political effects of organized crime remains limited.
The present proposal advances our knowledge of organized crime in two main directions. First, I will explore the effects of organized crime on the allocation and effectiveness of public spending, focusing on two important areas of government spending: public procurement and public subsidies to private firms. This analysis will advance our knowledge of the practices through which captured politicians can distort the allocation of resources in favour of criminal organizations, their implications for the efficiency of government intervention, and the effectiveness of alternative policy responses.
Second, whilst previous research has focused almost exclusively on the traditional areas of origin of criminal organizations, I will study the effects of criminal groups moving to new regions and countries. I will focus in particular on three different contexts: i) the “transplant” of criminal organizations from southern to northern Italian regions; ii) interactions of immigrants and natives in criminal activity in the wake of recent migration to the Netherlands; and iii) the inflow of members of the Sicilian Mafia into the US during the period of alcohol prohibition (1920-1933). The present proposal will advance our understanding of how criminal groups can relocate to new regions and countries; their interactions with the criminal groups that may already be present there; and the economic and social effects in the areas of destination. From a methodological perspective, all projects will take advantage of unique micro-level data and state-of-the-art econometric methods for impact evaluation to provide clean evidence on causal relationships.
Max ERC Funding
1 770 838 €
Duration
Start date: 2020-03-01, End date: 2025-02-28
Project acronym CoDiM
Project Competition in Digital Markets
Researcher (PI) Francesco Decarolis
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITA COMMERCIALE LUIGI BOCCONI
Country Italy
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2020-COG
Summary The advent of digital markets is affecting all economic activities. From how consumers discover and purchase products to how firms connect to consumers and other businesses, from the way workers and firms learn about each other to the way labor itself is organized, digital platforms are creating new opportunities and challenges for individuals, businesses and governments.
The tendency for digital platforms to assume a “winner takes all” form, where the market tips to a situation of highly concentrated oligopoly or even monopoly, puts into question whether the forces of free market competition are enough to guarantee that this concentration does not harm consumers and businesses.
This proposal describes three empirical projects that will advance the frontier of our understanding of the role of competition in digital markets.
1) The Role of Intermediaries in Digital Advertising. This part studies how competition in digital advertising is evolving due to the emergence of intermediaries. Using data on both the links between advertisers and intermediaries and on internet search ad campaigns, it estimates a model of many-to-many matching to examine how advertisers and intermediaries select each other.
2) Competition and Defaults in Online Search. This part studies how consumer bias interacts with competition in internet search. Exploiting a public intervention mandating changes to the default settings for search engines on Android smartphones in Europe, it studies how the design of default options impacts search engine market shares, search quality and advertiser behaviour.
3) The Price of Privacy in Digital Markets. Competition in digital markets involves combinations of prices and forms of monetization of users’ data. Using data from the smartphone app market, this part estimates a structural model of demand and supply to quantify the interplay between prices, ads and privacy and to counterfactually evaluate interventions limiting firms’ ability to monetize users' data.
Summary
The advent of digital markets is affecting all economic activities. From how consumers discover and purchase products to how firms connect to consumers and other businesses, from the way workers and firms learn about each other to the way labor itself is organized, digital platforms are creating new opportunities and challenges for individuals, businesses and governments.
The tendency for digital platforms to assume a “winner takes all” form, where the market tips to a situation of highly concentrated oligopoly or even monopoly, puts into question whether the forces of free market competition are enough to guarantee that this concentration does not harm consumers and businesses.
This proposal describes three empirical projects that will advance the frontier of our understanding of the role of competition in digital markets.
1) The Role of Intermediaries in Digital Advertising. This part studies how competition in digital advertising is evolving due to the emergence of intermediaries. Using data on both the links between advertisers and intermediaries and on internet search ad campaigns, it estimates a model of many-to-many matching to examine how advertisers and intermediaries select each other.
2) Competition and Defaults in Online Search. This part studies how consumer bias interacts with competition in internet search. Exploiting a public intervention mandating changes to the default settings for search engines on Android smartphones in Europe, it studies how the design of default options impacts search engine market shares, search quality and advertiser behaviour.
3) The Price of Privacy in Digital Markets. Competition in digital markets involves combinations of prices and forms of monetization of users’ data. Using data from the smartphone app market, this part estimates a structural model of demand and supply to quantify the interplay between prices, ads and privacy and to counterfactually evaluate interventions limiting firms’ ability to monetize users' data.
Max ERC Funding
1 721 425 €
Duration
Start date: 2021-08-01, End date: 2026-07-31
Project acronym Connections
Project Oligopoly Markets and Networks
Researcher (PI) Andrea Galeotti
Host Institution (HI) LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
Country United Kingdom
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2016-COG
Summary Via our connections we learn about new ideas, quality of products, new investment opportunities and job opportunities. We influence and are influenced by our circle of friends. Firms are interconnected in complex processes of production and distribution. A firm’s decisions in a supply chain depends on other firms’ choices in the same supply chain, as well as on firms' behaviour in competing chains. Research on networks in the last 20 years has provided a series of tolls to study a system of interconnected economic agents. This project will advance the state of the art by further developing new applications of networks to better understand modern oligopoly markets.
The project is organised into two sub-projects. In sub-project 1 networks will be used to model diffusion and adoption of network goods. Different consumers' network locations will summarise different consumers' level of influence. The objectives are to understand how firms incorporate information about consumers' influence in their marketing strategies—pricing strategy and product design. It will provide a rigorous framework to evaluate how the increasing ability of firms to gather information on consumers’ influence affects outcomes of markets with network effects. In sub-project 2 networks will be used to model how inputs—e.g., intermediary goods and patents—are combined to deliver final goods. Possible applications are supply chains, communication networks and networks of patents. The objectives are to study firms' strategic behaviour, like pricing and R&D investments, in a complex process of production and distribution, and to understand the basic network metrics that are useful to describe market power. This is particularly important to provide a guide to competition authorities and alike when they evaluate mergers in complex interconnected markets.
Summary
Via our connections we learn about new ideas, quality of products, new investment opportunities and job opportunities. We influence and are influenced by our circle of friends. Firms are interconnected in complex processes of production and distribution. A firm’s decisions in a supply chain depends on other firms’ choices in the same supply chain, as well as on firms' behaviour in competing chains. Research on networks in the last 20 years has provided a series of tolls to study a system of interconnected economic agents. This project will advance the state of the art by further developing new applications of networks to better understand modern oligopoly markets.
The project is organised into two sub-projects. In sub-project 1 networks will be used to model diffusion and adoption of network goods. Different consumers' network locations will summarise different consumers' level of influence. The objectives are to understand how firms incorporate information about consumers' influence in their marketing strategies—pricing strategy and product design. It will provide a rigorous framework to evaluate how the increasing ability of firms to gather information on consumers’ influence affects outcomes of markets with network effects. In sub-project 2 networks will be used to model how inputs—e.g., intermediary goods and patents—are combined to deliver final goods. Possible applications are supply chains, communication networks and networks of patents. The objectives are to study firms' strategic behaviour, like pricing and R&D investments, in a complex process of production and distribution, and to understand the basic network metrics that are useful to describe market power. This is particularly important to provide a guide to competition authorities and alike when they evaluate mergers in complex interconnected markets.
Max ERC Funding
829 000 €
Duration
Start date: 2017-06-01, End date: 2022-05-31
Project acronym CONSERVATION
Project The Economics and Politics of Conservation
Researcher (PI) Baard Gjul Harstad
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITETET I OSLO
Country Norway
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2015-CoG
Summary The UN’s approach to climate policy is to focus on national emission caps for greenhouse gases. Most of the economic theory on environmental agreements is also studying such a demand-side approach, even though it is well known that such an approach has several flaws, including carbon leakage and the incentive to free ride. Recent theory has suggested that a better approach may be to focus on the supply-side of the equation, rather than the demand-side. While this recent theory is promising, it is only indicative and has several shortcomings that must be analysed. The goal of this project is to investigate in depth how to best use conservation as an environmental policy tool. The project aims at integrating the theory of emissions and pollution with a model of extraction and thus the supply of exhaustible resources in a coherent and dynamic game-theoretic framework. I will apply this framework to analyse negotiations, agreements, and contracts on extraction levels, and how such policies can interact, complement or substitute for agreements focusing on consumption/emissions. It will also be important to develop and apply the tools of political economics to investigate which (second-best) agreement one may expect to be feasible as equilibria of the game. For highly asymmetric settings, where the possessors of the resource are few (such as for tropical forests), side transfers are necessary and contract theory will be the natural analytical tool when
searching for the best agreement. However, also standard contract theory needs to be developed further once one recognizes that the “agent” in the principal-agent relationship is an organization or a government, rather than an individual.
Summary
The UN’s approach to climate policy is to focus on national emission caps for greenhouse gases. Most of the economic theory on environmental agreements is also studying such a demand-side approach, even though it is well known that such an approach has several flaws, including carbon leakage and the incentive to free ride. Recent theory has suggested that a better approach may be to focus on the supply-side of the equation, rather than the demand-side. While this recent theory is promising, it is only indicative and has several shortcomings that must be analysed. The goal of this project is to investigate in depth how to best use conservation as an environmental policy tool. The project aims at integrating the theory of emissions and pollution with a model of extraction and thus the supply of exhaustible resources in a coherent and dynamic game-theoretic framework. I will apply this framework to analyse negotiations, agreements, and contracts on extraction levels, and how such policies can interact, complement or substitute for agreements focusing on consumption/emissions. It will also be important to develop and apply the tools of political economics to investigate which (second-best) agreement one may expect to be feasible as equilibria of the game. For highly asymmetric settings, where the possessors of the resource are few (such as for tropical forests), side transfers are necessary and contract theory will be the natural analytical tool when
searching for the best agreement. However, also standard contract theory needs to be developed further once one recognizes that the “agent” in the principal-agent relationship is an organization or a government, rather than an individual.
Max ERC Funding
1 571 554 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-08-01, End date: 2021-07-31
Project acronym DEPP
Project Designing Effective Public Policies
Researcher (PI) Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Country United Kingdom
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2015-CoG
Summary This proposal outlines a number of projects in public economics, with links to other fields such as macro, real estate, labor, and gender economics. The projects evolve around several large administrative datasets from the UK and Denmark, and they advance approaches and methodologies that have recently been developed in public economics into new areas. There is a strong public policy focus running through the proposal, including tax policy, transfer policy, family policy, and indirectly monetary policy. The objective is to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how government interventions affect two key markets: the housing market and the labor market.
The project is divided into two themes. The first theme focuses on the housing market and is divided into three subprojects. The first project investigates the effects of mortgage interest rates on leverage and house prices, and it develops a new quasi-experimental method for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, a crucial parameter for many public policies. The second and third projects investigate housing market responses to different tax policies, focusing on how such responses are magnified by liquidity constraints and leverage.
The second theme focuses on the labor market and is divided into two subprojects. The first project studies secular changes in gender inequality and the underlying sources of those changes, focusing mainly on the effects of child rearing on gender inequality. The project explores the underlying mechanisms driving child-related inequality, including gender identity norms and family policies. The second project proposes a new way of estimating macro labor supply elasticities that integrates taxes and public expenditures, and it develops a theoretical framework to draw policy implications from those estimations.
Summary
This proposal outlines a number of projects in public economics, with links to other fields such as macro, real estate, labor, and gender economics. The projects evolve around several large administrative datasets from the UK and Denmark, and they advance approaches and methodologies that have recently been developed in public economics into new areas. There is a strong public policy focus running through the proposal, including tax policy, transfer policy, family policy, and indirectly monetary policy. The objective is to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how government interventions affect two key markets: the housing market and the labor market.
The project is divided into two themes. The first theme focuses on the housing market and is divided into three subprojects. The first project investigates the effects of mortgage interest rates on leverage and house prices, and it develops a new quasi-experimental method for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, a crucial parameter for many public policies. The second and third projects investigate housing market responses to different tax policies, focusing on how such responses are magnified by liquidity constraints and leverage.
The second theme focuses on the labor market and is divided into two subprojects. The first project studies secular changes in gender inequality and the underlying sources of those changes, focusing mainly on the effects of child rearing on gender inequality. The project explores the underlying mechanisms driving child-related inequality, including gender identity norms and family policies. The second project proposes a new way of estimating macro labor supply elasticities that integrates taxes and public expenditures, and it develops a theoretical framework to draw policy implications from those estimations.
Max ERC Funding
1 294 699 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-06-01, End date: 2021-05-31
Project acronym DEVORHBIOSHIP
Project The Developmental Origins of Health: Biology, Shocks, Investments, and Policies
Researcher (PI) Gabriella CONTI
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Country United Kingdom
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2018-COG
Summary What are the origins of inequalities in health? A recent literature in economics has established causal impacts of early life shocks, investments and policies on lifelong health. However, several unknowns remain. The mechanisms through which shocks, investments, and policies interact are just beginning to be understood. Our knowledge of sensitive periods is imprecise. Little is also known about the impact of shocks and policies across different ages. Commonly used health capital measures, such as birth weight, lack sensitivity and specificity. The interplay between genes and environments in the formation of health inequalities is poorly understood.
To fill these gaps, I will build on insights from my earlier work, and use a combination of high-quality data, more sensitive measures, robust identification strategies and richer models to untangle the complex interactions between biology, shocks, investments and policies.
First, I will investigate causal impacts and mechanisms of two public health policies on child health and development: medical treatments for pregnancy complications and prenatal home visiting programmes. Second, I will examine the effects of two environmental shocks (pollution and influenza) on the formation of early health and human capital, and their interplay with maternal investments in nutrition. Third, I will study interactions between shocks, investments and policies from birth to adulthood, to understand the dynamic interplay between SES and health. Throughout, I will explore their interactions with genetic susceptibility or potential.
I will analyse administrative records, registries linked to survey data, cohort data with biomarkers; and a randomized controlled trial. I will use state-of-the-art econometric techniques for observational and experimental data. My findings will have direct policy implications and will help understand whether and to which extent early life interventions are a cost-effective mean to promote health.
Summary
What are the origins of inequalities in health? A recent literature in economics has established causal impacts of early life shocks, investments and policies on lifelong health. However, several unknowns remain. The mechanisms through which shocks, investments, and policies interact are just beginning to be understood. Our knowledge of sensitive periods is imprecise. Little is also known about the impact of shocks and policies across different ages. Commonly used health capital measures, such as birth weight, lack sensitivity and specificity. The interplay between genes and environments in the formation of health inequalities is poorly understood.
To fill these gaps, I will build on insights from my earlier work, and use a combination of high-quality data, more sensitive measures, robust identification strategies and richer models to untangle the complex interactions between biology, shocks, investments and policies.
First, I will investigate causal impacts and mechanisms of two public health policies on child health and development: medical treatments for pregnancy complications and prenatal home visiting programmes. Second, I will examine the effects of two environmental shocks (pollution and influenza) on the formation of early health and human capital, and their interplay with maternal investments in nutrition. Third, I will study interactions between shocks, investments and policies from birth to adulthood, to understand the dynamic interplay between SES and health. Throughout, I will explore their interactions with genetic susceptibility or potential.
I will analyse administrative records, registries linked to survey data, cohort data with biomarkers; and a randomized controlled trial. I will use state-of-the-art econometric techniques for observational and experimental data. My findings will have direct policy implications and will help understand whether and to which extent early life interventions are a cost-effective mean to promote health.
Max ERC Funding
1 738 763 €
Duration
Start date: 2019-04-01, End date: 2024-03-31
Project acronym DIA
Project Deep Integration Agreements
Researcher (PI) Ralph Ossa
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITAT ZURICH
Country Switzerland
Call Details Consolidator Grant (CoG), SH1, ERC-2018-COG
Summary This project aims to improve our understanding of deep integration agreements, which have generated an extraordinary amount of controversy in recent years. Unlike ordinary trade agreements, deep integration agreements do not just focus on reducing tariff barriers but seek to achieve much broader economic integration. Prominent examples include the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiated between the EU and the US and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiated between the EU and Canada.
I proceed in three complementary parts, focusing on the most controversial deep integration issues. In a first part, I consider provisions regarding investor protection including the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System. My ambition is to provide a comprehensive theoretical treatment of international investment agreements, which sheds light on their fundamental purpose and assesses their real-world design. In a second part, I turn to efforts towards regulatory cooperation such as CETA’s Regulatory Cooperation Forum. Here, my goal is again to provide a broad theoretical analysis, which identifies the scope for regulatory cooperation and makes suggestions for their real-world design. In a third part, I study intellectual property rights protection, specifically the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In particular, I propose to take a canonical model of intellectual property rights agreements to the data and quantitatively assess the efficiency and equity implications of TRIPS.
Summary
This project aims to improve our understanding of deep integration agreements, which have generated an extraordinary amount of controversy in recent years. Unlike ordinary trade agreements, deep integration agreements do not just focus on reducing tariff barriers but seek to achieve much broader economic integration. Prominent examples include the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiated between the EU and the US and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiated between the EU and Canada.
I proceed in three complementary parts, focusing on the most controversial deep integration issues. In a first part, I consider provisions regarding investor protection including the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System. My ambition is to provide a comprehensive theoretical treatment of international investment agreements, which sheds light on their fundamental purpose and assesses their real-world design. In a second part, I turn to efforts towards regulatory cooperation such as CETA’s Regulatory Cooperation Forum. Here, my goal is again to provide a broad theoretical analysis, which identifies the scope for regulatory cooperation and makes suggestions for their real-world design. In a third part, I study intellectual property rights protection, specifically the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In particular, I propose to take a canonical model of intellectual property rights agreements to the data and quantitatively assess the efficiency and equity implications of TRIPS.
Max ERC Funding
1 433 281 €
Duration
Start date: 2019-01-01, End date: 2023-12-31
