Project acronym BayesianMarkets
Project Bayesian markets for unverifiable truths
Researcher (PI) Aurelien Baillon
Host Institution (HI) ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary Subjective data play an increasing role in modern economics. For instance, new welfare measurements are based on people’s subjective assessments of their happiness or their life satisfaction. A problem of such measurements is that people have no incentives to tell the truth. To solve this problem and make those measurements incentive compatible, I will introduce a new market institution, called Bayesian markets.
Imagine we ask people whether they are happy with their life. On Bayesian markets, they will trade an asset whose value is the proportion of people answering Yes. Only those answering Yes will have the right to buy the asset and those answering No the right to sell it. Bayesian updating implies that “Yes” agents predict a higher value of the asset than “No” agents do and, consequently, “Yes” agents want to buy it while “No” agents want to sell it. I will show that truth-telling is then the optimal strategy.
Bayesian markets reward truth-telling the same way as prediction markets (betting markets) reward people for reporting their true subjective probabilities about observable events. Yet, unlike prediction markets, they do not require events to be objectively observable. Bayesian markets apply to any type of unverifiable truths, from one’s own happiness to beliefs about events that will never be observed.
The present research program will first establish the theoretical foundations of Bayesian markets. It will then develop the proper methodology to implement them. Finally, it will disseminate the use of Bayesian markets via applications.
The first application will demonstrate how degrees of expertise can be measured and will apply it to risks related to climate change and nuclear power plants. It will contribute to the political debate by shedding new light on what true experts think about these risks. The second application will provide the first incentivized measures of life satisfaction and happiness.
Summary
Subjective data play an increasing role in modern economics. For instance, new welfare measurements are based on people’s subjective assessments of their happiness or their life satisfaction. A problem of such measurements is that people have no incentives to tell the truth. To solve this problem and make those measurements incentive compatible, I will introduce a new market institution, called Bayesian markets.
Imagine we ask people whether they are happy with their life. On Bayesian markets, they will trade an asset whose value is the proportion of people answering Yes. Only those answering Yes will have the right to buy the asset and those answering No the right to sell it. Bayesian updating implies that “Yes” agents predict a higher value of the asset than “No” agents do and, consequently, “Yes” agents want to buy it while “No” agents want to sell it. I will show that truth-telling is then the optimal strategy.
Bayesian markets reward truth-telling the same way as prediction markets (betting markets) reward people for reporting their true subjective probabilities about observable events. Yet, unlike prediction markets, they do not require events to be objectively observable. Bayesian markets apply to any type of unverifiable truths, from one’s own happiness to beliefs about events that will never be observed.
The present research program will first establish the theoretical foundations of Bayesian markets. It will then develop the proper methodology to implement them. Finally, it will disseminate the use of Bayesian markets via applications.
The first application will demonstrate how degrees of expertise can be measured and will apply it to risks related to climate change and nuclear power plants. It will contribute to the political debate by shedding new light on what true experts think about these risks. The second application will provide the first incentivized measures of life satisfaction and happiness.
Max ERC Funding
1 500 000 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-01-01, End date: 2020-12-31
Project acronym COMPLEXITY
Project Understanding the Complexity of Modern Financial Systems
Researcher (PI) Vikrant Vig
Host Institution (HI) LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2015-STG
Summary The modern financial system has undergone immense transformation in recent years and is far more complex than ever before. In lockstep, financial regulation has also become more complex. This research proposal attempts to improve our understanding of potential drivers of this complexity and the implications of this change on the allocation of resources.
Taking a positive rather than a normative approach, I will analyse post-crisis changes at both the micro- and at the macro-levels to create a broader understanding of complexities in the current financial system. In order to do so, I will employ a set of advanced research designs, as well as a uniquely assembled micro-level dataset covering state and privately owned financial institutions in Asia, Africa, South America and Europe.
This project will focus on two interconnected areas of research: 1) Organisation of Credit, 2) Financial regulation in a complex environment. The aim of this project is to create a sustainable framework for the study of post-crisis financial systems, and to shape the current debate on the future of post-crisis financial structures and the development of policy in this area. Not only will this research have a considerable impact on our understanding of financial systems, it will also impact fields beyond finance, like Organisational Economics, Industrial Organisation and Development Economics.
Summary
The modern financial system has undergone immense transformation in recent years and is far more complex than ever before. In lockstep, financial regulation has also become more complex. This research proposal attempts to improve our understanding of potential drivers of this complexity and the implications of this change on the allocation of resources.
Taking a positive rather than a normative approach, I will analyse post-crisis changes at both the micro- and at the macro-levels to create a broader understanding of complexities in the current financial system. In order to do so, I will employ a set of advanced research designs, as well as a uniquely assembled micro-level dataset covering state and privately owned financial institutions in Asia, Africa, South America and Europe.
This project will focus on two interconnected areas of research: 1) Organisation of Credit, 2) Financial regulation in a complex environment. The aim of this project is to create a sustainable framework for the study of post-crisis financial systems, and to shape the current debate on the future of post-crisis financial structures and the development of policy in this area. Not only will this research have a considerable impact on our understanding of financial systems, it will also impact fields beyond finance, like Organisational Economics, Industrial Organisation and Development Economics.
Max ERC Funding
1 498 947 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-04-01, End date: 2021-03-31
Project acronym CompSCHoice
Project A Comprehensive Approach to School Choice and Education
Researcher (PI) Caterina Calsamiglia Costa
Host Institution (HI) INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GOVERNANCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary School choice is one of the most hotly debated policies in education. Advocates argue that school choice allows equal access to high quality schooling for all. High-income families have always had more choice, either through residential choice or through enrolment in private schools. Therefore increased choice should also improve equity by allowing minority and low-income students to choose too. On the other hand, school choice critics suggest that school choice can increase sorting between schools based on their socio-economics status, suggesting high-income families benefit more from these policies.
Three different and disconnected literatures in economics provide different and often contradicting answers to these questions. We propose a unified theoretical framework that merges these three literatures and allows for a comprehensive analysis on school choice design and its impact on actual choice, outcomes and segregation in schools and neighborhoods. Unique and newly constructed data sets are used to address novel empirical challenges. The data constructed for Barcelona shall become one of the largest and most comprehensive data sets not only on school choice but also on public education worldwide.
Using the data set from Barcelona we 1) estimate families’ preferences and, for the first time, evaluate the efficiency of different mechanism through structural estimation of our model and counterfactual analysis. We then 2) evaluate the impact that peer effects have on parents' choice and on outcomes. Exploiting the occurrence of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the aid programs implemented we aim at 3) estimating the distribution of willingness to pay for quality schools for families with different socio-economics. And last we exploit a policy change in Catalunya in 2009 to 4) provide evidence on how increased flexibility of the school system to adapt for differential maturity levels affects individual short and medium-term outcomes.
Summary
School choice is one of the most hotly debated policies in education. Advocates argue that school choice allows equal access to high quality schooling for all. High-income families have always had more choice, either through residential choice or through enrolment in private schools. Therefore increased choice should also improve equity by allowing minority and low-income students to choose too. On the other hand, school choice critics suggest that school choice can increase sorting between schools based on their socio-economics status, suggesting high-income families benefit more from these policies.
Three different and disconnected literatures in economics provide different and often contradicting answers to these questions. We propose a unified theoretical framework that merges these three literatures and allows for a comprehensive analysis on school choice design and its impact on actual choice, outcomes and segregation in schools and neighborhoods. Unique and newly constructed data sets are used to address novel empirical challenges. The data constructed for Barcelona shall become one of the largest and most comprehensive data sets not only on school choice but also on public education worldwide.
Using the data set from Barcelona we 1) estimate families’ preferences and, for the first time, evaluate the efficiency of different mechanism through structural estimation of our model and counterfactual analysis. We then 2) evaluate the impact that peer effects have on parents' choice and on outcomes. Exploiting the occurrence of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the aid programs implemented we aim at 3) estimating the distribution of willingness to pay for quality schools for families with different socio-economics. And last we exploit a policy change in Catalunya in 2009 to 4) provide evidence on how increased flexibility of the school system to adapt for differential maturity levels affects individual short and medium-term outcomes.
Max ERC Funding
1 207 500 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-08-01, End date: 2020-07-31
Project acronym Disasters
Project Market Beliefs and Optimal Policy in the Presence of Disasters
Researcher (PI) Ian William Richard Martin
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary My proposal consists of two strands linked by a common theme--namely a concern for the impact of disasters, in financial markets and more generally--and by a shared methodology.
In the first of these strands, I propose to develop ways of using observable asset price data to infer the beliefs of market participants about various quantities that are central to financial economics, including (i) the equity premium; (ii) the forward-looking autocorrelation of the market (i.e., time-series momentum); (iii) the risk premia associated with individual stocks; (iv) the correlation between stocks; and (v) measures of asymmetric risk, such as the forward-looking probability of a significant downward jump in the stock market over some prescribed time period.
This work will exploit theoretical techniques that I have developed in previous research, and that allow for the possibility of jumps and disasters in financial markets. I will therefore be able to avoid the unpalatable assumption—which is made, implicitly or explicitly, in much of the finance literature—that uncertainty is driven by conditionally Normally distributed shocks (or, in continuous time, by Brownian motions). The importance of doing so is underscored by the turmoil in financial markets over the last few years.
These techniques will also be applied in the second strand of my proposal, which focuses on issues related to catastrophes more generally, including for example climate change; highly contagious viruses on the scale of the influenza pandemic of 1918; or nuclear or bio-terrorism. This project will be joint with Professor Robert S. Pindyck of MIT. The goal is to provide a framework within which policymakers, faced with multiple different types of potential catastrophe, can determine how society’s limited resources should best be used to alleviate the associated risks.
Summary
My proposal consists of two strands linked by a common theme--namely a concern for the impact of disasters, in financial markets and more generally--and by a shared methodology.
In the first of these strands, I propose to develop ways of using observable asset price data to infer the beliefs of market participants about various quantities that are central to financial economics, including (i) the equity premium; (ii) the forward-looking autocorrelation of the market (i.e., time-series momentum); (iii) the risk premia associated with individual stocks; (iv) the correlation between stocks; and (v) measures of asymmetric risk, such as the forward-looking probability of a significant downward jump in the stock market over some prescribed time period.
This work will exploit theoretical techniques that I have developed in previous research, and that allow for the possibility of jumps and disasters in financial markets. I will therefore be able to avoid the unpalatable assumption—which is made, implicitly or explicitly, in much of the finance literature—that uncertainty is driven by conditionally Normally distributed shocks (or, in continuous time, by Brownian motions). The importance of doing so is underscored by the turmoil in financial markets over the last few years.
These techniques will also be applied in the second strand of my proposal, which focuses on issues related to catastrophes more generally, including for example climate change; highly contagious viruses on the scale of the influenza pandemic of 1918; or nuclear or bio-terrorism. This project will be joint with Professor Robert S. Pindyck of MIT. The goal is to provide a framework within which policymakers, faced with multiple different types of potential catastrophe, can determine how society’s limited resources should best be used to alleviate the associated risks.
Max ERC Funding
1 287 755 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-05-01, End date: 2020-04-30
Project acronym DYNAMICSS
Project Labour market dynamics and optimal policies
Researcher (PI) Camille Gregoire Alexis Landais
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2015-STG
Summary From pension reforms to UI extensions, the optimal tax and program design literature is often ill-equipped to provide clear guidance in policy debates on the reform of social insurance and tax-and-benefit systems. The reason is that this literature is mostly focused on static settings, while these programs are inherently dynamic: they specify a schedule of tax and benefits that is time or state dependent and they affect individuals’ decisions throughout their lifetime.
DYNAMICSS will offer a simple and general approach to the analysis of optimal dynamic policies that connects to the data. The key idea of DYNAMICSS is to extend the sufficient statistics (SS) approach to dynamic settings and characterize the full time profile, rather than the average generosity, of social insurance and transfer policies. By expressing optimal policy as a function of a limited set of statistics, the SS approach has the advantage of making clear the trade-offs implied in optimal tax or benefit formulae and of tightly integrating the theory and the empirics of optimal policy analysis, to offer robust policy guidance.
DYNAMICSS will use unique administrative data and cutting-edge econometric techniques to exploit compelling variations in policy profiles and offer significant contributions to the empirical analysis of dynamic behavioural responses to policies. A central contribution will be to create a unique measure of consumption expenditures based on leveraging complete administrative information on income, transfers and wealth to offer ground-breaking evidence of the effect of social insurance on consumption dynamics.
Part I will use and extend the SS framework to analyse the optimal time profile of UI benefits. Part II will develop this approach for analysing the optimal design of retirement pension systems. Part III will address optimal family policies with a focus on understanding the different dynamics of men and women in the labour market, and exploring the role of cultural norm
Summary
From pension reforms to UI extensions, the optimal tax and program design literature is often ill-equipped to provide clear guidance in policy debates on the reform of social insurance and tax-and-benefit systems. The reason is that this literature is mostly focused on static settings, while these programs are inherently dynamic: they specify a schedule of tax and benefits that is time or state dependent and they affect individuals’ decisions throughout their lifetime.
DYNAMICSS will offer a simple and general approach to the analysis of optimal dynamic policies that connects to the data. The key idea of DYNAMICSS is to extend the sufficient statistics (SS) approach to dynamic settings and characterize the full time profile, rather than the average generosity, of social insurance and transfer policies. By expressing optimal policy as a function of a limited set of statistics, the SS approach has the advantage of making clear the trade-offs implied in optimal tax or benefit formulae and of tightly integrating the theory and the empirics of optimal policy analysis, to offer robust policy guidance.
DYNAMICSS will use unique administrative data and cutting-edge econometric techniques to exploit compelling variations in policy profiles and offer significant contributions to the empirical analysis of dynamic behavioural responses to policies. A central contribution will be to create a unique measure of consumption expenditures based on leveraging complete administrative information on income, transfers and wealth to offer ground-breaking evidence of the effect of social insurance on consumption dynamics.
Part I will use and extend the SS framework to analyse the optimal time profile of UI benefits. Part II will develop this approach for analysing the optimal design of retirement pension systems. Part III will address optimal family policies with a focus on understanding the different dynamics of men and women in the labour market, and exploring the role of cultural norm
Max ERC Funding
1 049 855 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-03-01, End date: 2021-02-28
Project acronym INATTENTION
Project Behavioral and Policy Implications of Rational Inattention
Researcher (PI) Filip Matejka
Host Institution (HI) NARODOHOSPODARSKY USTAV AKADEMIE VED CESKE REPUBLIKY VEREJNA VYZKUMNA INSTITUCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2015-STG
Summary This proposal outlines agenda which aims to improve our understanding of policies in environments with cognitively limited agents. It seeks to extend and apply the theory of rational inattention developed in macroeconomics. Citizens are inattentive to details of tax codes, government bureaucrats cannot inspect all data about people in need, and voters are highly uninformed about politicians’ campaign platforms. The agenda is specifically targeted at applications where human inability to digest all available information has strong implications for public policy formation. It falls into three broad parts.
First (macroeconomics), the proposed research will develop a new model of risk-sharing in a typical modern-macro setting with heterogeneous agents. Instead of incentive constraints, the imperfections will be driven by the government’s or citizens’ inability to process all available information. What are the properties of the resulting system of redistribution? Why do taxes often take a simple form? Can minorities be left behind because they attract less of the government’s attention?
Second (behavioral economics), it will extend the rational inattention theory to model how agents simplify multidimensional features of the environment. Among many applications, the theory is likely to provide an alternative explanation for mental accounting, when people have separate budgets for different types of expenditures (critical to consumption decisions, especially of the poor), and for salience of different elements of the tax code.
Third (political economy), it will develop a unified framework to study implications of voters’ rational inattention (selective ignorance) for the outcomes of political processes, such as for popular demand for misguided policies, public good provision, and the complexity of announced platforms. Voters’ information acquisition and fragmented information processing will be studied in a field experiment.
Summary
This proposal outlines agenda which aims to improve our understanding of policies in environments with cognitively limited agents. It seeks to extend and apply the theory of rational inattention developed in macroeconomics. Citizens are inattentive to details of tax codes, government bureaucrats cannot inspect all data about people in need, and voters are highly uninformed about politicians’ campaign platforms. The agenda is specifically targeted at applications where human inability to digest all available information has strong implications for public policy formation. It falls into three broad parts.
First (macroeconomics), the proposed research will develop a new model of risk-sharing in a typical modern-macro setting with heterogeneous agents. Instead of incentive constraints, the imperfections will be driven by the government’s or citizens’ inability to process all available information. What are the properties of the resulting system of redistribution? Why do taxes often take a simple form? Can minorities be left behind because they attract less of the government’s attention?
Second (behavioral economics), it will extend the rational inattention theory to model how agents simplify multidimensional features of the environment. Among many applications, the theory is likely to provide an alternative explanation for mental accounting, when people have separate budgets for different types of expenditures (critical to consumption decisions, especially of the poor), and for salience of different elements of the tax code.
Third (political economy), it will develop a unified framework to study implications of voters’ rational inattention (selective ignorance) for the outcomes of political processes, such as for popular demand for misguided policies, public good provision, and the complexity of announced platforms. Voters’ information acquisition and fragmented information processing will be studied in a field experiment.
Max ERC Funding
950 424 €
Duration
Start date: 2016-04-01, End date: 2021-03-31
Project acronym INFO TECHNOLOGY
Project Information Technology and Institutions Supporting Human Capital Accumulation and Exchange
Researcher (PI) Jeremiah Edward Dittmar
Host Institution (HI) LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary Information technology revolutions transform the production and exchange of ideas and drive profound institutional and cultural change. History provides unique settings to document the causal impact of changes in information technology and institutions, and the best evidence on their long-run effects.
The objective of the research is to document the impact of revolutionary transformations in information technology and institutions using evidence from the European Renaissance. Printing was the new information technology of the Renaissance and is arguably the best parallel to the internet. Print media transmitted ideas that led to significant institutional change. But no quantitative research systematically documents the impact of these innovations.
The research will innovate by constructing ground-breaking micro-data on media markets, human capital, and institutions; developing cutting edge estimators for high-dimensional data to measure ideas in the media; and using historical sources of exogenous variation to identify cause and effect.
The research has three strands. The first will document the impact of competition on idea diffusion and institutional change during the Protestant Reformation. The research will construct firm-level data on all known books in German-speaking Europe 1450-1600, use high-dimensional estimators to measure ideas in print, and identify exogenous variation in competition from archival data.
The second strand will document the origins of persistent differences in human capital accumulation by constructing new data on city laws that set up the first experiments in public education and on virtually all German university students 1400-1550, and by using local shocks to support causal inference.
The third strand will document the impact of organizations supporting knowledge diffusion that were complementary to printing by constructing data on all European scholarly societies and journals and using historical shocks to identify their impact.
Summary
Information technology revolutions transform the production and exchange of ideas and drive profound institutional and cultural change. History provides unique settings to document the causal impact of changes in information technology and institutions, and the best evidence on their long-run effects.
The objective of the research is to document the impact of revolutionary transformations in information technology and institutions using evidence from the European Renaissance. Printing was the new information technology of the Renaissance and is arguably the best parallel to the internet. Print media transmitted ideas that led to significant institutional change. But no quantitative research systematically documents the impact of these innovations.
The research will innovate by constructing ground-breaking micro-data on media markets, human capital, and institutions; developing cutting edge estimators for high-dimensional data to measure ideas in the media; and using historical sources of exogenous variation to identify cause and effect.
The research has three strands. The first will document the impact of competition on idea diffusion and institutional change during the Protestant Reformation. The research will construct firm-level data on all known books in German-speaking Europe 1450-1600, use high-dimensional estimators to measure ideas in print, and identify exogenous variation in competition from archival data.
The second strand will document the origins of persistent differences in human capital accumulation by constructing new data on city laws that set up the first experiments in public education and on virtually all German university students 1400-1550, and by using local shocks to support causal inference.
The third strand will document the impact of organizations supporting knowledge diffusion that were complementary to printing by constructing data on all European scholarly societies and journals and using historical shocks to identify their impact.
Max ERC Funding
1 275 044 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-05-01, End date: 2020-10-31
Project acronym InfoAggregation
Project Information Aggregation in Elections
Researcher (PI) Stephan Lauermann
Host Institution (HI) RHEINISCHE FRIEDRICH-WILHELMS-UNIVERSITAT BONN
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary Elections are the foundation for democratic decision making. This research program will examine the effects of biased and privately informed entities—election organizers—on the ability of elections to aggregate information: Existing theory demonstrates that large electorates can reach correct decisions by aggregating information dispersed among many voters. However, existing theory does not account for the ubiquitous presence of biased organizers who intend to affect the election outcome. Examples of biased organizers may include a CEO holding a shareholder vote, a regional government holding a referendum, and political parties in general elections.
This project will develop and analyze new models of voting that account for the effects of biased organizers on information aggregation. One of the examples I consider is an election organizer who can increase voter participation at some cost (e.g., through advertising). Preliminary work suggests that the presence of biased organizers has significant impact. As increasing participation becomes cheap, equilibria exist where the election organizer recruits a large number voters and yet the majority votes almost surely for the organizer’s favorite policy. This failure of information aggregation contrasts starkly with existing results for elections in which the number of voters is exogenously large.
I will study the effectiveness of institutional safeguards against such manipulation, including supermajority rules, publicity requirements, and the regulation of communication to voters, and I will apply the theory in the context of shareholder voting and corporate control. Thus, this research program has important implications for the design of elections in realistic voting scenarios.
Summary
Elections are the foundation for democratic decision making. This research program will examine the effects of biased and privately informed entities—election organizers—on the ability of elections to aggregate information: Existing theory demonstrates that large electorates can reach correct decisions by aggregating information dispersed among many voters. However, existing theory does not account for the ubiquitous presence of biased organizers who intend to affect the election outcome. Examples of biased organizers may include a CEO holding a shareholder vote, a regional government holding a referendum, and political parties in general elections.
This project will develop and analyze new models of voting that account for the effects of biased organizers on information aggregation. One of the examples I consider is an election organizer who can increase voter participation at some cost (e.g., through advertising). Preliminary work suggests that the presence of biased organizers has significant impact. As increasing participation becomes cheap, equilibria exist where the election organizer recruits a large number voters and yet the majority votes almost surely for the organizer’s favorite policy. This failure of information aggregation contrasts starkly with existing results for elections in which the number of voters is exogenously large.
I will study the effectiveness of institutional safeguards against such manipulation, including supermajority rules, publicity requirements, and the regulation of communication to voters, and I will apply the theory in the context of shareholder voting and corporate control. Thus, this research program has important implications for the design of elections in realistic voting scenarios.
Max ERC Funding
616 003 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-07-01, End date: 2020-06-30
Project acronym LTI
Project Long-Term Investment
Researcher (PI) Alexander Edmans
Host Institution (HI) LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary The typical 20th-century firm was capital-intensive and competed on cost efficiency. The 21st-century firm is different. Competitive success increasingly depends on product quality, which in turn hinges on intangible assets such as brand strength, innovation, and corporate culture. Unlike tangible investment such as buying a factory, the fruits of intangible investment may take several years to appear. A manager pressured to maximise short-term earnings may fail to invest, jeopardising the long-term future of his firm. This project will study the determinants and consequences of long-term investment through three linked components.
Financial Markets. The traditional view is that financial markets dissuade investment by forcing firms to cater to short-term shareholders. I will study two channels through which markets promote investment. First, traders gather information about a firm’s past investments and incorporate it into stock prices by trading - rewarding the manager for good investment. Second, traders can gather information about a firm’s future investment opportunities - informing the manager about his future investment decisions. I aim to analyse what determines the efficiency of both channels.
Incentives. Most research on incentives focuses on either the level of pay, or the sensitivity of pay to performance, but it is the horizon of incentives that is key to promoting investment. I will theoretically analyse the optimal incentive horizon, and empirically demonstrate how it affects long-term decisions. Moving beyond managers, I will study how to incentivise teachers to focus on their pupils’ long-run development rather than “teaching-to-the-test.”
Effects of Investment. A key to inducing long-run investment is to demonstrate its benefits, but this is difficult due to data availability. I aim to gather data on a firm’s corporate social responsibility – its investment in its stakeholders – and link it to firm value.
Summary
The typical 20th-century firm was capital-intensive and competed on cost efficiency. The 21st-century firm is different. Competitive success increasingly depends on product quality, which in turn hinges on intangible assets such as brand strength, innovation, and corporate culture. Unlike tangible investment such as buying a factory, the fruits of intangible investment may take several years to appear. A manager pressured to maximise short-term earnings may fail to invest, jeopardising the long-term future of his firm. This project will study the determinants and consequences of long-term investment through three linked components.
Financial Markets. The traditional view is that financial markets dissuade investment by forcing firms to cater to short-term shareholders. I will study two channels through which markets promote investment. First, traders gather information about a firm’s past investments and incorporate it into stock prices by trading - rewarding the manager for good investment. Second, traders can gather information about a firm’s future investment opportunities - informing the manager about his future investment decisions. I aim to analyse what determines the efficiency of both channels.
Incentives. Most research on incentives focuses on either the level of pay, or the sensitivity of pay to performance, but it is the horizon of incentives that is key to promoting investment. I will theoretically analyse the optimal incentive horizon, and empirically demonstrate how it affects long-term decisions. Moving beyond managers, I will study how to incentivise teachers to focus on their pupils’ long-run development rather than “teaching-to-the-test.”
Effects of Investment. A key to inducing long-run investment is to demonstrate its benefits, but this is difficult due to data availability. I aim to gather data on a firm’s corporate social responsibility – its investment in its stakeholders – and link it to firm value.
Max ERC Funding
899 105 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-04-01, End date: 2018-03-31
Project acronym PEMP
Project Political Economy with Many Parties: Strategic Electorate and Strategic Candidates
Researcher (PI) Laurent Bouton
Host Institution (HI) UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES
Call Details Starting Grant (StG), SH1, ERC-2014-STG
Summary Most real-life elections involve many candidates. Coordination problems in multicandidate elections make the strategic behavior of political agents fundamentally different than in two-candidate elections. The literature’s typical focus on two-candidate settings is thus a clear handicap to understand elections outside the US. The main objective of this project is two-fold: (i) generating new methodological tools to analyze the behavior of candidates and the electorate in multicandidate elections, and (ii) using those tools to generate new knowledge. These are crucial steps toward designing better political institutions.
Component 1 focuses on the strategic behavior of voters. The objectives are: (i) to develop a more realistic model of strategic voting by including both strategic and non-strategic voters; (ii) to estimate the share of strategic and non-strategic voters in the electorate using laboratory experiments; (iii) to study voter behavior under relevant electoral rules, and their equilibrium properties.
Component 2 focuses on campaign contributions. The methodological challenge is to develop a novel model that captures the coordination problems faced by contributors. Though this topic deserves study in and of itself, it is not the only rationale for this component. Given similarities between strategic voting and strategic contributing, I am convinced that innovations in modelling strategic voting could emerge.
Component 3 jointly studies the behavior of the electorate and candidates. The methodological challenge is to develop a novel model sufficiently simple to be used in many institutional setups, but sufficiently sophisticated to capture the subtleties of the strategic interactions between candidates and the electorate, and within each group. I consider two different approaches that build on Components 1 and 2, respectively. I will use this model to study important political economy applications (e.g. income redistribution, lobbying, and media influence).
Summary
Most real-life elections involve many candidates. Coordination problems in multicandidate elections make the strategic behavior of political agents fundamentally different than in two-candidate elections. The literature’s typical focus on two-candidate settings is thus a clear handicap to understand elections outside the US. The main objective of this project is two-fold: (i) generating new methodological tools to analyze the behavior of candidates and the electorate in multicandidate elections, and (ii) using those tools to generate new knowledge. These are crucial steps toward designing better political institutions.
Component 1 focuses on the strategic behavior of voters. The objectives are: (i) to develop a more realistic model of strategic voting by including both strategic and non-strategic voters; (ii) to estimate the share of strategic and non-strategic voters in the electorate using laboratory experiments; (iii) to study voter behavior under relevant electoral rules, and their equilibrium properties.
Component 2 focuses on campaign contributions. The methodological challenge is to develop a novel model that captures the coordination problems faced by contributors. Though this topic deserves study in and of itself, it is not the only rationale for this component. Given similarities between strategic voting and strategic contributing, I am convinced that innovations in modelling strategic voting could emerge.
Component 3 jointly studies the behavior of the electorate and candidates. The methodological challenge is to develop a novel model sufficiently simple to be used in many institutional setups, but sufficiently sophisticated to capture the subtleties of the strategic interactions between candidates and the electorate, and within each group. I consider two different approaches that build on Components 1 and 2, respectively. I will use this model to study important political economy applications (e.g. income redistribution, lobbying, and media influence).
Max ERC Funding
1 499 110 €
Duration
Start date: 2015-08-01, End date: 2020-07-31