ERC FUNDED PROJECTS

Antibiotics have contributed to a tremendous increase in human well-being, saving many millions of lives. However, antibiotics become obsolete the more they are used as selection pressure promotes the development of resistant bacteria. The World Health Organization has proclaimed antibiotic resistance as a major global threat to public health. Today, 700,000 deaths per year are due to untreatable infections. To win the battle against antibiotic resistance, new policies affecting the supply and demand of existing and new drugs must be designed. I propose new research to identify and evaluate feasible and effective demand-side policy interventions targeting the relevant decision makers: physicians and patients. ABRSEIST will make use of a broad econometric toolset to identify mechanisms linking antibiotic resistance and consumption exploiting a unique combination of physician-patient-level antibiotic resistance, treatment, and socio-economic data. Using machine learning methods adapted for causal inference, theory-driven structural econometric analysis, and randomization in the field it will provide rigorous evidence on effective intervention designs. This research will improve our understanding of how prescribing, resistance, and the effect of antibiotic use on resistance, are distributed in the general population which has important implications for the design of targeted interventions. It will then estimate a structural model of general practitioners’ acquisition and use of information under uncertainty about resistance in prescription choice, allowing counterfactual analysis of information-improving policies such as mandatory diagnostic testing. The large-scale and structural econometric analyses allow flexible identification of physician heterogeneity, which ABRSEIST will exploit to design and evaluate targeted, randomized information nudges in the field. The result will be improved rational use and a toolset applicable in contexts of antibiotic prescribing.

1 498 920 €

Start date: 2019-01-01, End date: 2023-12-31

Rates of domestic violence and the relative risk of premature death for women are higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region. Yet we know remarkably little about the economic forces, incentives and constraints that drive discrimination against women in this region, making it hard to identify policy levers to address the problem. This project will help fill this gap. I will investigate gender discrimination from two complementary perspectives. First, through the lens of economic history, I will investigate the forces driving trends in women’s relative well-being since slavery. To quantify the evolution of well-being of sub-Saharan women relative to men, I will use three types of historical data: anthropometric indicators (relative height), vital statistics (to compute numbers of missing women), and outcomes of formal and informal family law disputes. I will then investigate how major economic developments and changes in family laws differentially affected women’s welfare across ethnic groups with different norms on women’s roles and rights. Second, using intra-household economic models, I will provide new insights into domestic violence and gender bias in access to crucial resources in present-day Africa. I will develop a new household model that incorporates gender identity and endogenous outside options to explore the relationship between women’s empowerment and the use of violence. Using the notion of strategic delegation, I will propose a new rationale for the separation of budgets often observed in African households and generate predictions of how improvements in women’s outside options affect welfare. Finally, with first hand data, I will investigate intra-household differences in nutrition and work effort in times of food shortage from the points of view of efficiency and equity. I will use activity trackers as an innovative means of collecting high quality data on work effort and thus overcome data limitations restricting the existing literature

1 499 313 €

Start date: 2018-08-01, End date: 2023-07-31

In most European countries social insurance programs, like welfare, unemployment insurance and disability insurance are characterized by low reemployment rates. Therefore, governments spend huge amounts of money on active labour market programs, which should help individuals in finding work. Recent surveys indicate that programs which aim at intensifying job search behaviour are much more effective than schooling programs for improving human capital. A second conclusion from these surveys is that despite the size of the spendings on these programs, evidence on its effectiveness is limited. This research proposal aims at developing an economic framework that will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of popular programs like offering reemployment bonuses, fraud detection, workfare and job search monitoring. The main innovation is that I will combine economic theory with recently developed econometric techniques and detailed administrative data sets, which have not been explored before. While most of the literature only focuses on short-term outcomes, the available data allow me to also consider the long-term effectiveness of programs. The key advantage of an economic model is that I can compare the effectiveness of the different programs, consider modifications of programs and combinations of programs. Furthermore, using an economic model I can construct profiling measures to improve the targeting of programs to subsamples of the population. This is particularly relevant if the effectiveness of programs differs between individuals or depends on the moment in time the program is offered. Therefore, the results from this research will not only be of scientific interest, but will also be of great value to policymakers.

550 000 €

Start date: 2008-07-01, End date: 2013-06-30

Subjective data play an increasing role in modern economics. For instance, new welfare measurements are based on people’s subjective assessments of their happiness or their life satisfaction. A problem of such measurements is that people have no incentives to tell the truth. To solve this problem and make those measurements incentive compatible, I will introduce a new market institution, called Bayesian markets. Imagine we ask people whether they are happy with their life. On Bayesian markets, they will trade an asset whose value is the proportion of people answering Yes. Only those answering Yes will have the right to buy the asset and those answering No the right to sell it. Bayesian updating implies that “Yes” agents predict a higher value of the asset than “No” agents do and, consequently, “Yes” agents want to buy it while “No” agents want to sell it. I will show that truth-telling is then the optimal strategy. Bayesian markets reward truth-telling the same way as prediction markets (betting markets) reward people for reporting their true subjective probabilities about observable events. Yet, unlike prediction markets, they do not require events to be objectively observable. Bayesian markets apply to any type of unverifiable truths, from one’s own happiness to beliefs about events that will never be observed. The present research program will first establish the theoretical foundations of Bayesian markets. It will then develop the proper methodology to implement them. Finally, it will disseminate the use of Bayesian markets via applications. The first application will demonstrate how degrees of expertise can be measured and will apply it to risks related to climate change and nuclear power plants. It will contribute to the political debate by shedding new light on what true experts think about these risks. The second application will provide the first incentivized measures of life satisfaction and happiness.

1 500 000 €

Start date: 2016-01-01, End date: 2020-12-31